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ABSTRACT 
In this study I examine the arguments made by Martha Nussbaum in Poetic Justice in 
defence of a positive role for literary engagement in the process of moral and political judgement 
formation. Nussbaum argues that novel reading offers a unique chance to engage our empathy in 
morally beneficial ways, because it stands as a kind of practice run for appropriate moral 
judgement through the adoption of an emotionally engaged yet critically distant “Judicious 
Spectator” stance when reading. I examine her account of the activity and purported benefits of 
reading and argue that her use of the Judicious Spectator concept is incompatible with her claims 
about the structure of novels and the experience of reading. I suggest examining an alternative 
set of fictions, namely the genre of science fiction and in particular Ursula K. Le Guin’s novel 
The Left Hand of Darkness as a means to assess whether Nussbaum’s account plausibly captures 
the moral value of reading fiction. I argue that even a charitable reading of Nussbaum’s 
Judicious Spectator concept cannot explain the central thought experiment at the heart of Le 
Guin’s novel, as it invites readers to contemplate a re-evaluation of their own self-identities or 
foundational assumptions, allowing them to abandon beliefs and understandings that have 
perhaps unwittingly coloured their previous moral reasoning without undergoing the scrutiny of 
justificatory rigour.  This resulting type of re-evaluation is, I argue, primarily self-reflective in 
nature and not externally directed to programmatic outcomes like the possible interpretations of 
the novel available to Nussbaum. This good, which I label ‘appropriate doubt’, is defended as a 
general feature of certain kinds of novel reading, and as worthy of moral attention. I conclude 
that this shows Nussbaum’s account of engagement with fiction to be at best, incomplete. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
Introduction 
 
What role, if any, does fiction have in moral development?  Could it be necessary for the 
development of sound moral capacities? It would be quite an overreach to claim that reading 
fiction is a necessary step in any person’s adequate moral development, especially given the 
relatively recent development of widespread literacy among the general populace (still very 
much an incomplete project), coupled with the exceedingly narrow timeframe of the ascendancy 
of long-form literature as the popular medium of choice (before the advent of cinema and 
television overtook it in the modern west). To be blunt, the very idea smacks of literary elitism, a 
position one would only think tenable if it were coupled with a belief in the widespread (and 
historically, near universal) failure of the human race to reach a bare minimum standard of 
proficiency in ethical reasoning. Despite this substantial qualification however, there is, as many 
readers can attest, a pervasive, persuasive, and long-standing intuition that engagement with 
fiction and moral reasoning are somehow connected. Our connection to literary characters elicits 
what feels like genuine and heartfelt emotional reactions, and our imaginative connection to 
fictional places and plots opens up new avenues of thought and possibility that seem to have 
direct applicability to the concrete social and political life in which we collectively engage, as 
direct analogies or as more metaphorical similarity. These powerful, yet historically ill-defined, 
notions surrounding the connection between our imaginative capacities of make-believe and the 
foundational questions of ethics and epistemology in the history of philosophy are some of the 
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longest running philosophical debates in the western tradition, stretching back as far as Plato’s 
declaration that poets are corruptors of the public realm and not welcome in his ideal state.1  
Despite this historically grounded interest in the connection between fiction and politics, 
engagement with the broad topic of fiction in the modern analytic context has focused mainly on 
questions of the nature of fictional entities and related ontological disagreements, or has been 
bracketed off in the aesthetic tradition, far away from the question originally posed by Plato 
about the consequences for social and political life of fictional uptake. Of the literature that does 
address the Platonic question of whether or not fictions are morally useful or harmful, much of 
the modern discussion has focused on an understanding of our engagement with fiction as 
primarily emotional in nature, contrasting this with the paradigm of rational deliberation to be 
found in idealized moral problem-solving scenarios and therefore dismissing or at least 
diminishing the potential value of fiction for the study of ethics. 
More recently, however, some philosophers have attempted to defend engagement with 
fiction as activating exactly the right kinds of emotional responses that are essential for sound 
moral judgements. Most prominent and vociferous among these contemporary defenders within 
the analytic tradition is Martha Nussbaum, who argues that novel reading offers us a unique 
chance to engage our empathy in morally significant (and if we choose our literature well, 
beneficial) ways. Her argument is both a defence of the usefulness of appropriate emotional 
responses to proper ethical reasoning, and a claim that at least some kinds of novel reading can 
provide us with precisely the kind of practice in critical judgement that is required for good 
moral reasoning. Central to this argument is Nussbaum’s discussion of how we can 
conceptualize emotional engagement that is still suitably distant from our own personal concerns 
                                                
1 Plato, The Republic (New York: Penguin Classics, 1992), 607. 
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so as to fulfill another strong intuition we have about sound moral judgements, namely, that they 
be appropriately agent neutral or objective.  
My own interest in the subject was spurred by encountering Nussbaum’s work on this 
subject. I was initially quite taken with Nussbaum’s view, as it seemed to me to provide a much 
needed practical discussion of examples and consequences to arguments defending a cognitive 
picture of the emotions and the related position that they therefore belonged in any plausible 
story of what human rational thought and judgement consisted in. Nussbaum’s contention that 
engagement with fiction carried (along with its aesthetic dimension) specific moral and political 
implications was bracing in its directness, and offered up a modern counter to Plato’s distrust.  
There are of course objections to her view, specifically aimed at what appears to be a 
lacuna in her argument between her robust defence of a role for the emotions in rational 
judgement and a somewhat narrow (perhaps even simplistic) discussion of the practical 
implications of our engagement with fictions. In short, it appears as though Nussbaum’s own 
imagination failed her when it came to working out just how broad or varied an impact fiction 
might have on a person and their judgment formation.  
I had conceived of this project initially as a way of augmenting her account with additional 
resources that I thought she lacked in order to deal adequately with a much broader range of 
literature than her initial focus on a specific set of realist novels, and more in line with her 
general claims on behalf of the activity of reading and the structure of novels and the narrative 
forms of fiction. My initial intent was therefore to offer a revised account of the activity of 
reading following Nussbaum’s view; one that was less causally direct than her own picture, in 
order to deal with cases of fiction that appeared to me to be overflowing with morally and 
politically significant ideas and also, in their form and structure, invitations to a uniquely 
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valuable kind of experience of engagement. In the best novels of science fiction I saw not only 
subtly articulated moral quandaries and solutions illuminated in compelling ways, but also a 
genre-specific method of engagement that buttresses Nussbaum’s defence of cognitively 
sophisticated emotions as valuable perceptions with a role to play in practical moral judgement. 
All of this is to say, I was very sympathetic to Nussbaum's stated aims and initial 
motivations in Poetic Justice. But the more I read and puzzled over how Nussbaum's view fit 
together, the more convinced I became that her account had at its heart a problematic conception 
of the activity of reading that stymied the forcefulness of her own defence of the value of fiction 
in moral deliberation. This lead to the critical analysis of her account contained in this paper, and 
ultimately to the conclusion that her conception of the activity of readers was implausible and 
internally inconsistent. 
In this study I examine in detail the arguments made by Nussbaum in defence of a positive 
role for literary engagement in the process of moral and political judgement formation. In 
Section 2.1, I outline the main tenets of Nussbaum’s view, which I name for ease of reference, 
the “Emotional Engagement View.” These are: first, the claim that engagement with narrative 
fiction is of particular moral worth, due in part to its detailed depiction of fully realized 
conceptions of how one should live. Second, that reading is pleasurable and this feature of 
literary engagement is itself a moral feature, as a relationship akin to friendship with the 
characters in novels is appropriate and perhaps essential for proper judgement. Third, the related 
claim that readers bring a general evaluative framework to bear on the worlds they encounter in 
fiction through their emotional responses, one that recognizes in very general terms what is 
harmful or helpful to the flourishing of human life. Nussbaum holds that the formal structural 
features of novels invite (and perhaps demand) certain types of reader response that align with 
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this facet of reader response. Finally, and centrally, Nussbaum claims that novel reading is 
ethically and politically valuable because it stands as a kind of practice run for appropriate moral 
judgement. It does this because reading fiction is relevantly similar to a standard of appropriate 
practical judgement she calls the “Judicious Spectator.” The Judicious Spectator position is an 
artificial construction that outlines an appropriate standard of objectivity, one that removes self-
interested emotional attachments while still allowing the right kinds of emotions to play their 
essential role in proper judgement. Nussbaum borrows the heart of this concept from Adam 
Smith’s “Impartial Spectator”, but, as will be noted below, her view diverges from Smith’s in 
several important respects.  
In Section 2.1.1, I retrace Nussbaum’s defence of a role for the emotions in rational 
judgement from two historic objections: the objection that the emotions are false perceptual data, 
and the objection that the emotions are inappropriately personal and therefore ineligible for 
inclusion in a rational standard of judgement. I conclude that Nussbaum offers us persuasive 
reasons to reject these dismissals, and that her inclusion of emotional perception in rational 
judgement at this most basic level is warranted.  
In Sections 2.1.2 and 2.1.3, I examine Nussbaum’s specific conception of the Judicious 
Spectator as an appropriate and objective standard of practical judgement that includes emotional 
responses. I conclude that Nussbaum’s use of the Judicious Spectator concept is imprecisely 
deployed in her defence of literary engagement. Specifically, Nussbaum is unclear about whether 
she means to adopt the Judicious Spectator as a normative ideal or standard for what appropriate 
uptake of fiction is like, or whether she means to argue that the Judicious Spectator stands as an 
apt and useful descriptive analogy for what reading fiction is like. I argue that in either instance, 
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Nussbaum risks undermining the coherence of her related claims about the nature of reading and 
the structure of novels.  
In Chapter three I take up in detail the consequences of understanding the Judicious 
Spectator as either a normative ideal or a descriptive claim. I examine the plausibility and 
consequences of three categories of objection to Nussbaum’s Judicious Spectator understood 
normatively, concluding that Nussbaum cannot adopt Adam Smith’s normative standard version 
of the Judicious Spectator without falling into inconsistency regarding her other claims about 
literary engagement. In Section 3.1.1, I discuss the objection that Nussbaum conflates two types 
of imaginative engagement in the concept of ‘Fancy’ within the Judicious Spectator position. I 
conclude that she cannot derive the specific liberal theoretical commitments she desires as end 
products of the Judicious Spectator procedure from this amalgamation of distinct imaginative 
projects. In Section 3.1.2, I consider the objections that the Judicious Spectator position is by its 
own father’s admission perhaps impossible to adopt, concluding that if understood as a success 
term, the Judicious Spectator appears circular. Further, I conclude that Nussbaum’s implied 
theory of textual impact (i.e. her suggestion that the novel constructs certain responses in the 
reader and further the impact a text has on a reader derives from the text and not from work done 
by the reader) precludes understanding the Judicious Spectator as an ideal standard of readerly 
activity. In Section 3.1.3, I examine the objection that the Judicious Spectator lacks the 
conceptual mechanics to make it a plausible normative standard. This counter argument posits 
that the Judicious Spectator, understood normatively, gives agents no mechanism to adjudicate 
between contesting claims of reasonableness regarding appropriate sentiment without falling 
back on prior social consensus. This is an unpalatable conclusion for Nussbaum, as she wishes to 
defend novel reading as potentially convention-breaking in its outcome. In Section 3.1.4, I 
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evaluate the implications for Nussbaum’s view understood as a normative standard of readerly 
activity, concluding that the Judicious Spectator cannot be read as such in a logically consistent 
and persuasive way.  
In the back half of Chapter three I turn to the other alternative interpretation of the 
Judicious Spectator on Nussbaum’s view, that of a descriptive claim about the activity of 
reading. In Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2, I survey critical objections to Nussbaum’s interpretations of 
specific novels as examples of the operation of the Judicious Spectator, concluding that although 
Nussbaum’s readings are implausible in their definitiveness, she could coherently abandon her 
view of textual impact and avoid these criticisms while maintaining a coherent conception of the 
Judicious Spectator as analogous to the activity of reading. Similarly, in Sections 3.2.3 and 3.2.4,  
I survey objections to Nussbaum’s empirical claims made on behalf of the structure of the novel 
and the consequences of an Aristotelian conception of cognitive emotional perceptions and the 
normative standard of human suffering and flourishing. I conclude again that Nussbaum cannot 
hold both a consistent view of the Judicious Spectator as descriptively analogous to the activity 
of reading, and her previously articulated empirical claims. However, this does not show by itself 
that the Judicious Spectator is an incorrect or implausible description of readers’ activity.  
In order to assess this matter, in Chapter four I suggest examining an alternative set of 
fictions, namely the genre of science fiction and in particular Ursula K. Le Guin’s novel The Left 
Hand of Darkness as a means to assess whether the Judicious Spectator, understood 
descriptively, does in fact plausibly capture the moral value of reading fiction. I argue that 
science fiction has some unique features as a genre that recommend it to the project of defending 
novel reading as of moral value. In order to fully explicate these features, I scrutinize Le Guin’s 
novel as a test case. In Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2, I survey the critical response to The Left Hand of 
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Darkness in order to counter possible arguments for dismissal of this case of engagement with 
literature as irregular or perverse relative to the standard activity of novel reading. I conclude that 
although this work, and science fiction as a genre, have particular characteristics, they do not run 
counter to the ordinary operation of readerly activity. Further, some of those genre features 
recommend science fiction as structurally inclined towards the aim of understanding engagement 
with fiction as morally valuable.  
In Section 4.3.3, I argue that even a charitable reading of Nussbaum’s Judicious Spectator 
concept, while potentially capturing some socially and politically relevant opportunities for 
engagement, cannot explain the central thought experiment at the heart of The Left Hand of 
Darkness. I argue that Le Guin’s novel invites its readers to contemplate a revaluation of their 
own self-identities or foundational assumptions, allowing them to abandon beliefs and 
understandings that have perhaps unwittingly coloured their previous moral reasoning without 
undergoing the scrutiny of justificatory rigour.  This resulting type of appropriate doubt is, I 
argue, primarily self-reflective in nature and not externally directed to programmatic outcomes 
like the possible interpretations of the novel available under the Judicious Spectator. This good, 
which I label ‘appropriate doubt’, is defended as a general feature of certain kinds of novel 
reading and as worthy of moral attention in Section 4.3.4. I conclude that this shows Nussbaum’s 
account of engagement with fiction to be at best, incomplete. 
In Chapter five I conclude my examination of this topic with some suggestions of avenues 
of further research and argumentation. I propose that Paul Ricoeur’s understanding of self-
identity as self-interpretation provides a potential avenue of exploration for more complete 
descriptive accounts of the phenomenology of engagement with literary works. I also suggest 
that the justificatory project of defending a constructivist grounding for moral obligation of the 
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sort Christine Korsgaard has defended may hold some interesting parallels to an understanding 
of readerly activity that takes into account the possibility of appropriate doubt.  
I conclude by surveying the arguments presented against Nussbaum’s Emotional 
Engagement View, arguing that I have shown the normative reading of her view to be 
inconsistent and the descriptive reading to be implausible as a definitive account. I do not think I 
have disproven Nussbaum’s claim that the emotions play an important role in appropriate moral 
and political judgment. Further, I do not claim to have shown that a descriptive understanding of 
the Judicious Spectator is incoherent, only that it is an incomplete description of the moral good 
of literary engagement. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
 
In this chapter I will outline Martha Nussbaum’s ‘practice run’ account of the moral value 
of reading fiction. I will show how Nussbaum responds to the standard objections for including 
the emotions in rational moral judgment and endorse her general claim that the emotions have an 
important role to play in moral judgment. I will then turn to Nussbaum’s account of which 
emotions are part of reliable moral judgment, focussing on her use of the concept of the 
Judicious Spectator. I will advance two competing plausible interpretations of Nussbaum’s 
Judicious Spectator, with textual evidence, and will utilize these interpretations in subsequent 
chapters to argue that she has not identified the single moral value of reading fiction.  
2.1 Nussbaum’s View  
According to Nussbaum, the moral value of fiction is found in recognizing that novel 
reading is a kind of practice ground for training our sentiments. She agrees with theorists who 
point out that our uptake of fictional works appears often to be driven (and sustained) by a strong 
element of emotional engagement we have with fictional works and their characters, but 
disagrees that such emotional reactions are problematic (even citing the “disconcerting” power of 
our emotional responses as a positive feature of novels).2 In her view, appropriate emotional 
evaluation is in fact necessary for good moral judgment, and imaginative engagement with works 
of fiction (especially readers’ ties to characters) stand as paradigmatic cases of the appropriate 
                                                
2 Martha C. Nussbaum, Poetic Justice: The Literary Imagination and Public Life (Boston, Mass: 
Beacon Press, 1995), 5.  
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place for our sympathetic imagination to be exercised. For Nussbaum, the form of the novel is 
itself of a special kind. That is, novels can uniquely express certain kinds of moral outlooks (or 
as she puts it, answers to the question ‘how should I live?’), positions, she argues, that cannot be 
adequately summarized or translated into other forms of prose writing.3 Accordingly, she claims 
that we cannot have fully explored the possibilities found in alternative ethical outlooks unless 
we have engaged with novels. In Poetic Justice she argues that we engage with fiction centrally 
through emotional engagement with the characters, attaching to their plight as we might to a 
friend’s.4 Novels, she argues, both embody and generate the activity of ‘Fancy’ (of seeing one 
thing as another, or of imagining non-existent possibilities).5  Nussbaum also contends that 
readers assess the particular conditions depicted in novels with reference to certain very general 
norms of human flourishing that are ‘built into’ their compassionate responses, carrying 
judgments of “what is serious damage to a life and what is not.”6 Nussbaum’s view is that we 
cannot help but bring such interpretations to bear on our engagement with the world presented in 
the fictional work, that they are embedded in our emotional reactions to an unfolding plot.7 Such 
responses are not just part of reader’s emotional reactions in her account, they are built into the 
very structure of the novel. As she says, “the novel constructs a paradigm of a style of ethical 
reasoning that is context-specific without being relativistic, in which we get potentially 
universalizable concrete prescriptions by bringing a general idea of human flourishing to bear on 
a concrete situation, which we are invited to enter through the imagination.” 8 
                                                
3 Nussbaum, Poetic Justice, 45, 22-29. 
4 Nussbaum, Poetic Justice, 5, 35. 
5 Nussbaum, Poetic Justice, 4. 
6 Nussbaum, Poetic Justice, 7. It is worth noting that this appears to be a descriptive claim on 
Nussbaum’s account, not a normative ideal, although she never clarifies satisfactorily. 
7 Nussbaum, Poetic Justice, 8. 
8 Nussbaum, Poetic Justice, 8. 
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 Nussbaum makes two strong claims about readers’ experience; first, she claims that it 
provides insights that should play a role in the formation of an acceptable moral and political 
theory. We should, if we are paying close attention, be able to see what has gone right (or wrong) 
in the specific case the novel presents us and be able to apply such judgments, in more general 
terms, to our understanding of very broad principles of social interaction and conduct.  We do 
this, Nussbaum argues, through our capacity for Fancy. This concept is for Nussbaum both the 
imaginative leap we make into other worlds or perspectives when immersed in a novel, and also 
the imaginative leap we make from the particular cases of morally significant actions depicted in 
said novels to more generalizable ethical principles. So, for example, readers of Hard Times are 
invited (through their emotional investment in the characters of that novel) to notice lives that are 
quite particular and rich, and also quite different from their own. The worn-down working class 
factory man Stephen Blackpool or the miserably married Louisa Gradgrind are vividly depicted 
in the novel and, Nussbaum argues, we are drawn by our attachment to them to wonder about 
their lives and their tragic situations (in the case of Stephen, being unable to choose his life path, 
having no access to the legal system and no recourse to improve his working or home conditions; 
for Louisa, being trapped in an awful marriage and having no emotional or moral resources to 
deal with adult life due to her strict utilitarian upbringing). Further, Nussbaum claims that the 
reader’s interest and emotional responses to these particular circumstances leads naturally 
(perhaps inevitably) to a kind of metaphorical imaginative leap, where readers consider the 
broader social or political climates that inform these specific character depictions. Attentive 
readers thus make the connection between their sympathy for Stephen and Louisa (or their 
feeling that these characters have been unjustly treated) and the larger social forces that lead to 
their individual tragic outcomes.  Secondly, she claims that readers develop moral capacities 
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without which citizens will be unable to practice the normative conclusions of such moral or 
political theories (which have themselves been influenced by insights gained through reading).9  
More plainly, Nussbaum thinks that fiction acts as a kind of practice for our ability to properly 
assess specific instances where general moral duties or principles might apply, to pick out what 
is salient about these cases and further, to apply this skill to both evaluating and applying general 
moral principles in a non-relativistic manner. Using Hard Times again as an example, readers 
practice their critical judgment when they determine that Stephen Blackpool is indeed unjustly 
denied by his society’s rigid class structure the kind of self-determination that makes up a good 
life. Similarly, readers, in their particular sympathy for Louisa Gradgrind, are practising picking 
out not just a tragic individual life due to a deformed childhood, but what (in general terms) has 
made it tragic (that her father’s rigorous application of utilitarian principles in childhood has left 
her without any emotional resources to navigate or even understand her adult life). Attentive 
readers, according to Nussbaum, will have practiced a particular skill in reading novels, that of 
attending to the specifics of individual lives with great attention and simultaneously of noting 
what about that particular life is morally pressing as it relates to our general moral principles (as 
opposed to accidental or morally irrelevant).  
Novels also clearly have the capacity to give pleasure and Nussbaum contends that this fact 
about them is not independent of their moral operations or usefulness, since the very focused 
attention that entices us to continue reading is “itself a moral feature.”10 Having written 
extensively on the value of keen awareness and attention to particularity as an essential moral 
task, I infer that she means that the close attention we pay to novels while immersed in them is 
itself a useful practice of another sort, that of paying close attention to the circumstances. This is 
                                                
9 Nussbaum, Poetic Justice, 12. 
10 Nussbaum, Poetic Justice, 35. 
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juxtaposed with the alternative possibility of following a more general application of 
predetermined set of rules in moral decision-making.11 Nussbaum’s central claim in her defense 
of the ethical and political value of novels is that novel reading is a good practice run, as it 
invites us to take up the position of the Judicious Spectator, that is, one who is emotionally 
engaged in the situation at hand, but suitably distant enough to retain a claim to objectivity (i.e. 
free of self-regarding emotional engagement).12 This is important because it satisfies a key 
intuition we have about fair moral judgments (that they be generalizable beyond one’s own 
interests) while still allowing our emotional responses to play an important role in coming to the 
correct conclusion. As will be shown below, the persuasiveness of Nussbaum’s view depends 
upon her claims about the Judicious Spectator position, so it is worth examining in detail what 
work this position is doing in her account. 
According to Nussbaum, if engagement with fiction is to be defended as morally 
beneficial, it must do so by appeal to the objectivity of our judgments. A question remains, 
however, about what should count as appropriately objective. For Nussbaum, the answer to this 
question is found in the concept of the Judicious Spectator position. Before detailing the contours 
of this view, it will be helpful to consider the kinds of objections most commonly articulated 
against the emotions that Nussbaum takes herself to be answering by appealing to the Judicious 
Spectator. I will briefly outline the standard objections to inclusion of the emotions in rational 
judgment and show that Nussbaum provides sound responses to these objections. I conclude that 
Nussbaum has made a case for the inclusion of emotions in moral judgment. 
 
                                                
11 See for example: Martha C. Nussbaum, “Finely Aware and Richly Responsible: Literature and 
the Moral Imagination” in Love’s Knowledge: Essay’s on Philosophy and Literature (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1990), 261-285. 
12 Nussbaum, Poetic Justice, 72-78. 
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2.1.1 A Role for the Emotions 
Nussbaum defends a role for the emotions in rational deliberation and judgment from two 
categories of objection. The first claims that the emotions are unstable, in two disparate ways. 
The crude version portrays the emotions as a sort of blind force within us, not responsive to 
judgments or reasons. On this view the emotions are the opposite of rationality (and therefore 
dismissed from a proper account of objectivity).13 A related objection (which Nussbaum 
attributes to Plato and his Stoic descendants) is the more nuanced charge that emotions are not 
the opposite of judgments, but rather much like judgments, only false. They are false because 
they show us that other people and events not under the purview of our will, or reason, matter. 
They show us to be vulnerable, incomplete without other humans, not fully self-sufficient. ⁠14 On 
this view, emotions are judgment-like, but nonetheless fail to promote the detached self-
sufficiency that the Stoics regarded as true and valuable. Thus, the Stoic claim that the emotions 
are cognitive in that they are a kind of perception of value, but false in that they value what 
should not be valued.  
The second set of objections can be generally categorized as worries about emotions 
lacking suitable distance from our own interests. Our emotional reactions are too personal to 
count in objective judgments, this view contends, as they focus on a person’s actual ties and 
attachments and therefore cannot be a part of rationality due to their inherent self-centeredness. 
The claim here is that personal emotional ties are not responsive to our duty to count each person 
as of equal moral weight.15 There is a further worry about the particularity of emotional 
responses, namely that emotions are too concerned with particular cases or events and not 
                                                
13 Nussbaum, Poetic Justice, 55-56. 
14 Nussbaum, Poetic Justice, 56-58. 
15 Nussbaum, Poetic Justice, 58-59.  
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focused enough on larger social units or periods of time, and so miss what really matters in our 
social and political lives.16 
Nussbaum counters these objections in a systematic and thoroughgoing section of 
argumentation in Poetic Justice, persuasively arguing that our emotions regularly seem to have 
definite objects (and further, they seem very responsive to beliefs about these objects).17 For 
example, if one is angry with a friend for a perceived slight and she explains her actions, that 
anger usually dissipates. If our emotions were blind forces contrary to reasonable judgment, 
these kinds of (quite regular) cases would seem bizarre to us, so the first objection cannot be 
true.  Further, Nussbaum argues, we may rightly ask of the Stoic objection why their proposed 
self-sufficiency is ideal. If we are not prepared to give up what we might call our social duties 
such as beneficence, the virtue of helping others when we are able, our social justice obligations 
etc., then the self-sufficiency proponents owe us a motivating account for such moral obligations. 
But as Nussbaum rightly notes, such accounts are difficult to motivate plausibly without 
reference to empathy, pity, or concern for others of any kind.18 ⁠ Nussbaum argues here that the 
problem for self-sufficiency viewpoints like those of the Stoics is that our moral intuitions tell us 
that we have at least some of these social obligations (obligations which she claims no major 
ethical thinker is prepared to dismiss entirely), and yet without reference to our emotions, there 
appears to be no mechanism to connect the suffering of others with our moral duties to them. The 
claim made here is that advocates of the self-sufficiency view owe us an explanation for how we 
might get to the appropriate appraisal of such situations without the emotions, since they do seem 
to give us fairly reliable access.  Nussbaum’s view is that we must take seriously the idea that 
                                                
16 Nussbaum, Poetic Justice, 59-60. 
17 Nussbaum, Poetic Justice, 61-62. 
18 Nussbaum, Poetic Justice, 64-66.  
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events outside of one’s control, like bad luck, can be of significant moral importance. (Think of 
the bad luck of losing a child to disease for example). We do this, she thinks, through our belief-
directed emotional responses to these situations such as pity or compassion.19 She argues that 
many so-called detached rationality theories do not hold this view of forces beyond one’s 
control, instead arguing for a normative conception of self-sufficiency that is impervious to such 
emotions that we normally think of as flowing from recognizing the fact of circumstantial 
vulnerability inherent to human life. However, Nussbaum argues that this view of moral virtue as 
free from emotional encumbrances struggles to give reasons that would motivate beneficent 
action, since external goods outside one’s own will are irrelevant on such a view, and caring 
about the luck of others appears to be the most common and reliable connection between 
ourselves and beneficent actions. Her view is that without appropriate emotional responses, we 
have difficulty getting to balanced practical judgments.20 Nussbaum has convincingly argued 
here that the emotions cannot be plausibly barred from the table of moral judgment. She makes a 
compelling case that they have an important role to play in such judgment. 
2.1.2 The Judicious Spectator 
Having established a foothold for our emotional responses, Nussbaum narrows her gaze to 
the Judicious Spectator position to help her settle the question of which emotions are reliable 
enough to be included in rational ethical decision making.21 Adam Smith’s idealized “Impartial 
Spectator” is her candidate for a trustworthy filtering device. As Smith outlines it, the Spectator 
is an explicitly normative ‘paradigm of public rationality’, an artificially constructed model used 
to outline the proper moral and rational point of view. The Judicious Spectator’s role is to 
                                                
19 Nussbaum, Poetic Justice, 65-66. 
20 Nussbaum, Poetic Justice, 66-69. 
21 Nussbaum, Poetic Justice, 72. 
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imagine vividly what it is like to be the people whose predicaments she is surveying, and to 
sympathetically identify with their situation. However the Spectator must also maintain a 
position of assessment external to the situation, in order to determine “the degree of compassion 
it is rational to have for the person.”22 It does this, Smith argues, by ensuring that we have only 
those sentiments, imaginations and thoughts that count as a part of a rational worldview.23 
Because such an observer will not have emotional reactions and thoughts that relate to his or her 
own happiness, well-being, or safety, they will be ‘without bias’ and able to survey the scene 
with a valuable kind of detachment.24 The advantage of such detachment is that it is not lacking 
in feeling (as opposed, one presumes, to some other potential candidates for objectivity).  
It seems as though Nussbaum is helping herself to an unexplained set of cognitive rational 
norms if she thinks that this proviso of ‘no self-interested emotions’ is enough for objectivity. 
There are easily imaginable cases where one’s own safety or well being is clearly not on the line 
but we still have emotional attachments that appear morally problematic. For example, a judge 
might have a feeling of contempt for a defendant before them because they played shortstop for a 
baseball team that was a bitter rival of the judge’s favourite. If this contempt inculcates a lack of 
what we might deem ‘appropriate’ sympathy for the shortstop’s plight, then it appears to conflict 
with our everyday intuitions about objectivity. However, it is not clear that the Judicious 
Spectator position, as Nussbaum relays it, reliably filters out this kind of emotional reaction. 
In Poetic Justice, Nussbaum fails to explain what norms of rationality are functioning in 
the concept of idealized spectatorship, but takes up the issue of which emotions are reliable 
                                                
22 Nussbaum, Poetic Justice, 73. 
23 Nussbaum, Poetic Justice, 73. 
24 Nussbaum, Poetic Justice, 73. 
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enough to be included in rational judgments in Love’s Knowledge.25 There she outlines Smith’s 
claim that some kinds of bodily ‘passions’ should be excluded from the judicious spectator’s 
position (such as hunger, sexual desire, and romantic love) as a way of examining what norms of 
rationality are at work in his account. According to Nussbaum, Smith excludes passion and 
appetite because he thinks we cannot enter into them from a position of friendly concern.26 In the 
case of hunger, we can feel sympathy for those suffering it, but we can’t take on the hunger itself, 
since it is based on a physical condition that we are not in.27⁠ Therefore, hunger is not (in itself) a 
moral response according to Smith. Similarly with romantic love, he argues we cannot enter into 
it from the position of the judicious spectator because it is “disproportioned to the value of the 
object.”28⁠ Love is based on a strong response to what Smith argues are morally irrelevant 
particularities, and therefore retains a colouring of arbitrariness.29⁠ Smith’s examples serve as a 
kind of limit-setting on what he claims is rationally appropriate attachment, enough proximity to 
the emotion to understand it, but not so much as to undermine the possibility of impartially and 
moral equality between persons. 
What justifies these pronouncements of moral irrelevance and unusable particularity in the 
case of hunger or love is, Nussbaum contends, a view of a standard of rationality that is tied up 
with the notion of sociability at the core of what it means to be human. As she says, for Smith, 
“what a concerned friend or a reader cannot respond to out of friendly concern… is somehow 
                                                
25 Martha C. Nussbaum, “Steerforth’s Arm: Love and the Moral Point of View” in Love’s 
Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 
335-364. 
26 Nussbaum, “Steerforth’s Arm”, 340-342. 
27 Nussbaum, “Steerforth’s Arm”, 340. 
28 Nussbaum quoting Smith in: Nussbaum, “Steerforth’s Arm”, 342. 
29 Nussbaum, “Steerforth’s Arm”, 342. 
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morally suspect.”30 This view thus postulates the ideal of proper or rational judgment as a kind of 
golden mean between the poles of overcommitted emotional particularity (which is lacking in 
appropriate distance) and unemotional calculation (which misses the essential perceptual data of 
emotional responses that make us human), while pointing out the peculiarity of a standard of 
proper judgment that did not include initial assumptions about the value of other humans.  
Since Smith argues that the Judicious Spectator’s responses are themselves constitutive of 
what is morally appropriate, Nussbaum rightly asks what justifies this view (“what is the moral 
significance of the spectatorial stance?”).31 Smith’s answer, she thinks, would be that morality 
essentially involves thinking of oneself as merely one among other persons, bound by this 
equality, but also sympathy and friendship to those others.32 This view does reduce in some 
sense to a claim about what it is like to be human. Further, Smith argues that these essential 
emotional ties provide a motivating reason, when we see them as an essential feature of 
humanity we are obligated to look around to “see and think of all that we can see” (that is, they 
require of us a kind of concentration or attention to the people we are interacting with), and also 
that they require social conversation (i.e. the giving and receiving of reasons).33 So for Smith at 
least, the Judicious Spectator position stands as a normative ideal, the viewpoint to strive for 
when we make practical moral judgments. And it is justified in part by an appeal to a standard of 
rationality that takes as essential a view of humans as irreducibly social.  
This stressing of our sociability also helps explain the reliance on literary examples to flesh 
out the Judicious Spectator. On this view we can see that such activities are among the ways we 
constitute ourselves as moral reasoners (since as we read, we naturally assume the viewpoint of 
                                                
30 Nussbaum, “Steerforth’s Arm”, 341. 
31 Nussbaum, “Steerforth’s Arm”, 345. 
32 Nussbaum, “Steerforth’s Arm”, 345. 
33 Nussbaum, “Steerforth’s Arm”, 345. 
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affectionate sociability that Smith claims is essential to good judgment). We ask ourselves when 
we enter into plots why the characters do what they do, and Nussbaum insists, we are put off 
when nothing but arbitrary answers are forthcoming.34 The reliance on literary examples can be 
seen as a natural outcome of a concern to incorporate within this account of proper judgment the 
idea that the views of others matter.35 
The question of what conception of the emotions is operating on this view is not answered 
by a mere appeal to their inclusion, and Nussbaum emphasizes that she agrees with Smith’s 
assessment of the emotions as at least partly cognitive. Further, she argues that they are part of 
correct perception (i.e. it is an inaccurate picture of what is happening before us if we omit our 
emotional responses).36 As she says, “appropriate emotions are useful in showing us what we 
might do, and also morally valuable in their own right, as recognitions of the character of the 
situation before us.”37 So for both thinkers, our emotions are based on belief and reasoning; they 
are a part of an appropriate or correct set of perceptual faculties. They are “a part of the 
equipment with which we register what is happening”.38  
2.1.3 Analysis 
The obvious question to be asked is ‘what makes an emotional response appropriate?’ On 
Nussbaum’s account, this is the task put to the Judicious Spectator. To be a trustworthy 
emotional response the emotion in question must be informed by a “true view of what is going 
                                                
34 Nussbaum, “Steerforth’s Arm”, 346. 
35 Nussbaum, Poetic Justice, 70. Nussbaum also argues that the novel, in its very form, 
“emphasizes the mutual interdependence of persons, showing the world as one in which we are 
all implicated in one another’s good and ill...”, a view that Smith appears to have shared and one 
that would make a great deal of sense given his emphasis on the social construction of proper 
judgement.  
36 Nussbaum, Poetic Justice, 74. 
37 Nussbaum, Poetic Justice, 74. 
38 Nussbaum, Poetic Justice, 74. 
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on.”39 This includes the facts of the case, an appropriate assessment of their significance to the 
actors in the situation being contemplated, and a rational assessment of whether the first-person 
responses of the actors in question are distorted (how they might be so distorted Nussbaum does 
not specify, but presumably by one’s own self-interested emotional reactions and beliefs, since 
the Judicious Spectator position is meant to specifically avoid the “portion of the emotion that 
derives from our personal interest in our own well-being.”)40 The tool of the Judicious Spectator, 
according to Nussbaum, is “aimed above all at filtering out” our emotional responses that are 
self-focused.41 
Whether we are to take Nussbaum’s use of the Judicious Spectator concept as a descriptive 
claim about the activity of reading (i.e. this is what it is like to read) or as a normative claim 
about what successful ethical reading looks like (i.e. this is what happens when reading is done 
properly) is not made clear in Poetic Justice. At certain points she makes seemingly descriptive 
claims about our engagement with literature, for example that “readership is, in effect, an 
artificial construction of judicious spectatorship, leading us in a pleasing natural way into the 
attitude that befits the good citizen and judge.”42 Nussbaum argues that some facts about our 
position as readers, and some facts about the structure of the novel as a type of work, make this 
clear. Novels, she contends, are necessarily focused on individuals, and so structurally 
predisposed to draw readers’ attention to the interplay between the very concrete particularity of 
character’s lives and the general norms of our emotional responses, and yet we are suitably 
distanced from them by our belief that they are not real.43  
                                                
39 Nussbaum, Poetic Justice, 74. 
40 Nussbaum, Poetic Justice, 74. 
41 Nussbaum, Poetic Justice, 74. 
42 Nussbaum, Poetic Justice, 75. 
43 Nussbaum, Poetic Justice, 8-9. 
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Nussbaum also includes a caveat in her claim about the structure of novels that indicates 
she thinks of the Judicious Spectator as a description of reading, not a standard to reach. She 
notes that we might be presented with a distorted or even harmful view of a situation by a 
fictional work. Novels can both get the facts of the matter wrong and can “misrepresent the 
importance of various types of suffering or harm, leading us to think them either graver or lighter 
than they really are.”44 Tellingly, her solution to this worry is not an appeal to the Judicious 
Spectator position as an arbiter of correct emotional engagement, but rather a suggestion that we 
exercise caution in our selection of reading materials and “read in dialogue with others”. Thus 
the view presented by any particular novel is unequivocally non-normative but subject to prior 
claims of rightness, although Nussbaum does not specify which standards we ought to appeal to 
in order to test if it measures up, other than to point to an unexplicated notion of “critical 
judgment”.45 Smith’s answer would seem to appeal to the standards of what the Judicious 
Spectator would see as correct, committed as he is to an enlightenment version of public 
rationality, but Nussbaum is unclear about whether she is prepared to follow him there.  
However, Nussbaum also makes reference to the Judicious Spectator as an explicitly 
normative concept on several occasions. Most notably, she points to the Judicious Spectator as 
her answer to the question of which emotional responses are appropriate to include in proper 
judgments.46 Smith is clear that his conception of the Spectator is an ideal, a norm of public 
rationality that could serve as a filtering device for improper emotional responses, and Nussbaum 
appears to employ the concept similarly in many portions of Poetic Justice. For example, in 
discussing the aforementioned worry of learning harmful lessons from some works of fiction, 
                                                
44 Nussbaum, Poetic Justice, 75. 
45 Nussbaum, Poetic Justice, 76. 
46 Nussbaum, Poetic Justice, 74-75.  
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Nussbaum confusingly advocates for canonical pruning initially, while in the very next 
paragraph endorses Smith’s view that “the formal structures implicit in the experience of literary 
readership give us a kind of guidance that is indispensable to any further inquiry—including a 
critical inquiry about the literary work itself.”47 She further claims that readers need not agree 
with the politics of a novel “in all ways” in order to find political value in the experience of it.48 
Thus the Judicious Spectator appears to be an expressly normative standard, and a reader might 
fail to live up the standard while engaged in the activity (despite Nussbaum’s insistence that the 
very structure of the novel invites the proper kind of judgment). We can see this is the case both 
in Nussbaum’s initial discussion of her three literary examples in Poetic Justice and in her 
response to critics of her readings of these works.49 For Nussbaum there appears to be a correct 
interpretation of a novel, and if the Judicious Spectator was only a description of the experience 
of novel reading it would be difficult to make sense of these claims.  
The consequences of this apparent equivocation appear to me to indicate a real trouble for 
her account. Remember my initial characterization of Nussbaum’s account as offering up two 
strong claims about reading: that it provides insight that should play a role in forming our 
theoretical ethical commitments, and that it develops important competencies, acting as a kind of 
practice run for forming appropriate moral judgments. If her use of the Judicious Spectator 
position is descriptive, then it appears as though Nussbaum can only make the second of her 
strong claims about reading stick. On this reading, the Judicious Spectator is an account of what 
the facts are like in the experience of reading, and Nussbaum can argue that we really do attend 
to novels in just the way that Smith thought we should attend to moral problems, so reading is a 
                                                
47 Nussbaum, Poetic Justice, 76. 
48 Nussbaum, Poetic Justice, 77. 
49 This facet of Nussbaum’s view will be taken up in detail in the next chapter.  
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good kind of practice run for developing our general moral capacities of empathy and critical 
distance. Of course she might be wrong about this descriptive claim, and persuasive arguments 
or examples that show our experience of reading to be notably different from Nussbaum’s 
account will be significant problems for her attempt to include literature on the ‘necessary for 
correct moral judgment’ list.  
If, however, Nussbaum is making a normative claim when appealing to the Judicious 
Spectator, then she retains a plausible answer to the question of how we might adjudicate 
between appropriate and inappropriate emotional responses in our moral judgments. The 
Judicious Spectator as Smith conceived of it was a normative ideal of rational judgment and if 
used as a similar success term on Nussbaum’s account it allows her to explain how reading 
novels can give us those insights indispensable to proper formation of our moral and political 
theories. It also appears to provide her with a normative standard of judgment to appeal to in 
making her claims about correct (or incorrect) literary interpretations. The quite specific moral 
lessons Nussbaum is keen to extract from Hard Times, Maurice, and Native Son make more 
argumentative sense if we think of the Judicious Spectator as embodying the ideal measure of 
public rationality. Readers who severely misread the ‘true view of the facts’ of human suffering, 
or are invited to deny the moral equality between people of different races or genders by a 
literary work, are simply failing to live up to the standard. However, on this interpretation 
Nussbaum appears to be vulnerable to counter-arguments surrounding the plausibility (and/or 
coherence) of the Judicious Spectator as an appropriate measure of moral objectivity. Further, 
her conclusion that we should prune our reading lists to avoid illiberal authorial viewpoints 
appears bizarre and unfounded if we understand the Judicious Spectator normatively.  
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In summary, the value of fiction on Nussbaum’s account is characterized as a practice 
ground for training appropriate sentiments, where the faculty of the sympathetic imagination gets 
its full content through the reading of novels with the adoption of the Judicious Spectator 
position. I will refer to this view henceforth as Nussbaum’s ‘Emotional Engagement View’. I 
have noted very briefly that Nussbaum appears to equivocate in her use of the Judicious 
Spectator concept while outlining her defense of the value of literature for moral and political 
reasoning. This lack of clarity provides two separate possible interpretations of her claim, one 
that emphasizes a descriptive claim about what reading is like, and one that emphasizes a version 
of appropriate norms for moral judgment. It should be clear that these differing interpretations of 
Nussbaum’s use of the Judicious Spectator position are mutually incompatible. In Chapter 3 I 
will examine in detail the case made by critics against Nussbaum’s account, first considering 
objections to her normative version of the Judicious Spectator and then evaluating the 
plausibility of her descriptive version in turn.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
 
In the previous chapter, I outlined Nussbaum’s arguments for her Emotional Engagement 
View of reading, and pointed out that her account, while persuasive in carving out a role for the 
emotions in proper judgment, is ambiguous in several important respects. More specifically, she 
is unclear about when she is making descriptive claims about the nature of reading, empirical 
claims about the structure and form of novels and novel reading, or normative claims about what 
appropriate uptake of novels looks like. This lack of clarity in Nussbaum’s defense of literature 
invites two possible interpretations of her use of the Judicious Spectator concept, a descriptive 
understanding and a normative success understanding. In the first half of this chapter I will 
consider in detail criticisms of Nussbaum’s account that understand her as articulating a 
normative conception of the Judicious Spectator, and the related understanding of idealized 
reader-text interaction and imaginative capacity that align with this conception. I take up the 
possibility of the Judicious Spectator as a descriptive claim in the latter half of this chapter. 
Several thinkers raise worries about whether Nussbaum’s Emotional Engagement View of 
reading provides a framework appropriate for moral deliberation, and whether her own 
arguments in favour of the view are internally consistent. I will consider each objection in turn, 
making note where argumentative lines appear to converge or diverge. Since Nussbaum does not 
differentiate between these possible readings herself, several critical analyses direct their doubts 
at a hybrid proposal of sorts. I have tried in the first four sections of this chapter to focus on the 
arguments that raise doubts about the viability of understanding the Judicious Spectator as a 
 28 
normative standard, but there are consequences for her other claims, some of which I will not 
discuss until I address a descriptive understanding of the Judicious Spectator in the later half of 
this chapter. Some criticisms, such as Simon Stow’s worry about the impossibility of actually 
adopting the Judicious Spectator viewpoint can be read as applying to both normative and 
descriptive claims.  
3.1 The Judicious Spectator as Normative Claim 
I have organized the normative-claim objections under three overarching problems: 1) The 
Problem of Consistency 2) The Problem of Possibility, and 3) The Problem of Plausibility. In 
section four I will discuss what I take the consequences of these objections to be for Nussbaum’s 
account. I conclude that her project cannot be coherently understood as articulating a normative 
ideal for readers to live up to without abandoning both her conception of the novel and her 
specific moral and political conclusions. Given that Nussbaum’s overarching aim is precisely to 
arrive at these conclusions, it appears clear that the Judicious Spectator as employed by 
Nussbaum cannot be defended as offering a coherent normative standard for readers. 
3.1.1 The Problem of Consistency 
In his paper “Fancy Justice: Martha Nussbaum on the Political Value of the Novel”, 
Nickolas Pappas raises concerns about the coherence of Nussbaum’s use of imagination as a 
concept in her explanation of the Emotional Engagement View. The sympathetic imagination 
aroused by our novel reading is tasked with multitudinous and disparate functions by Nussbaum, 
from a whetstone for more keen perception about the individual lives of characters unlike 
ourselves (and their analogous relationship with the real world in properly attuned judicial 
rulings),50 all the way to inculcation of general liberal principles of tolerance and justice played 
                                                
50 Nussbaum, Poetic Justice, 99-118. 
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out in the political realm.51 While we might well need a kind of sympathetic imaginative leap in 
both instances, Pappas raises doubts about whether they are actually the same capacity that 
Nussbaum identifies as flourishing in her Judicious Spectator.52 Judges, whatever social policy 
concerns they might factor into their decisions, must always start with particular cases and 
particular persons (what Pappas dubs the ‘practical side’ of sympathy). These cases do seem (at 
least potentially) relevantly like the empathetic practice we might get from novels.53  
However, Pappas questions whether this attention to particularity might be counter-
productive in cases of generalized theoretical commitments to equality or justice. As he notes, 
“the imagination’s preference for concrete detail often makes for quite un-Rawlsian results.”54 
He argues that the job of a properly attuned political imagination at the level of theoretical 
commitment is precisely to not pay attention to the details of particular individuals, and instead 
to neglect the particularly stirring cases in favour of more equitable solutions (ones that 
specifically do not pick out individuals in their concrete detail but apply to broad swaths of the 
public).55  
                                                
51 Nussbaum, Poetic Justice, 11. 
52 Nickolas Pappas, “Fancy Justice: Martha Nussbaum on the Political Value of the Novel,” 
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly vol. 78 (1997), 284-86. 
53 Pappas, 285-85.  
54 Pappas, 286. 
55 Pappas, 286-87. The problem with the concrete or practical imagination is that attention the 
particular harms done to individuals (like in the sexual harassment case considered in Poetic 
Justice) can obscure more general patterns of behaviour modification that cannot be brought out 
easily by attending more closely to the details of any one case of such discrimination. For 
example, First Nations people who might avoid calling the police for fear of potential 
discrimination, thereby removing a social safety net most unthinkingly enjoy. Pappas, drawing 
on the work of Henry Louis Gates, persuasively argues that this kind of malevolent social 
influence requires a different sort of “imaginative effort” to see than attention to the particularity 
of any individual case, and that concentration on the particular cases actually hinders our ability 
to engage in the appropriate kinds of abstract imaginings that are necessary to see the larger issue 
and to legislate appropriately.  
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Further, Pappas points to an apparent difference between the practical and theoretical uses 
of these imaginative capacities, as the possibilities for such imagination within any given theory 
commitment surely cannot reduce to psychological facts about the person applying the theory 
(else who was applying the theory would significantly alter its outputs). Conversely, “the 
problem with insufficiently imaginative theories is just that they leave no room for emotionally 
perceptive policy-makers to act on what they observe”.56 His point is that we might well prefer a 
more imaginative theory of measuring social outcomes (over the coarse utilitarianism described 
by Dickens in Hard Times for example), but that is a structural feature of the theory, not 
dependent on the subtlety with which it is applied in any particular case.57 So even if our 
capacities for the kind of practical imagination of stepping into another’s life or world are indeed 
enlarged by novel reading, it isn’t clear at all how that leads us to adopt better theoretical moral 
commitments. We are after all, presumably not building our own moral theories from scratch 
every time we read a new book. Further, Pappas argues that Nussbaum owes us an explanation of 
how we even get to the more abstract and theoretical form of interpersonal empathy from these 
concrete cases.58 The claim that both kinds of empathy require a kind of ‘imaginative leap’ is not 
enough to show that they are the same capacity. 
Pappas’s objections can be understood in part as scepticism about the link between our 
imaginative engagement with fiction and the concrete social and political consequences 
enumerated by Nussbaum. Nussbaum emphasizes that this imaginative leap, conditioned as it is 
                                                
56 Pappas, 285. 
57 Clearly this objection is one that carries weight on either reading of Nussbaum’s Judicious 
Spectator, since to interpret the Emotional Engagement View as a descriptive claim about what 
the reading experience is like does not diminish Pappas’ point that the excellent and subtle 
application of any particular theory does not alter its structural characteristics. If there is no 
column in your theory that counts a phenomenon you think valuable, you cannot arrive at the 
proper sum of it, no matter how carefully you count.  
58 Pappas, 292. 
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by the structure of the novel, does not merely lead to some rather definite political attitudes, but 
to political practice, which appears to follow from this structuring of the imaginative 
engagement. At her most definitive, she makes claims about our growth as readers leading not 
only to more subtle understandings of individual cases, but better theoretical commitments as 
well.59 This implies that we should also be revising our guiding moral and political theories in 
light of new capacities gained, that a kind of reflective equilibrium between our pre-existing 
commitments and our newfound attention to the structured concrete imaginings of the Judicious 
Spectator should emerge. While this might sound intuitively plausible, Pappas’ critique shows us 
the conceptual difficulties with this strong claim. The kind of theoretical abstraction necessary to 
form subtle and imaginative theories is distinct from a practical attention to individual detail. 
This criticism has consequences for understanding Nussbaum’s use of the Judicious 
Spectator position as a normative success term, in that it challenges the coherence of the 
Judicious Spectator as an objective standard for judgment. Pappas does not dispute that reading 
may indeed give us some kind of practice-run for a type of imaginative empathy. His objection is 
that the kind of concrete focus championed by Nussbaum as a hallmark of engagement with 
literature appears to be quite a different sort of imagining than that of imagining people in the 
abstract. His allusion to Rawls is apt here, and points to one of the unexamined tensions in 
Nussbaum’s account; she wishes to defend the novel as a causally significant tool of moral 
improvement and also to derive very Rawlsian moral and political outcomes (namely a modern 
liberal viewpoint). Of course, Rawls famously argued that the imaginative leap necessary to see 
our way through to his principles of justice was precisely opposite to this sort of concrete 
                                                
59 Nussbaum, Poetic Justice, 3, 45, 51-52. In fact, Nussbaum’s introduction of her project 
includes on pg. 3 the hope that the insights gained from reading novels will lead to better social 
policy and better social theory.  
 32 
particularity. In his view, the way to fruitfully imagine our way to liberal conclusions such as the 
Difference Principle was to remove all one’s individual detail, to think about individuals without 
any of their ‘concrete particularity’.60 Pappas argues that Nussbaum not only conflates these two 
very different kinds of imaginings under the umbrella of ‘Fancy’, but further wishes to derive the 
consequences of the theoretical imagination from the process of exercising the practical or 
concrete imagination. 
3.1.2 The Problem of Possibility 
Simon Stow raises the question of the possibility of actually adopting the Judicious 
Spectator perspective. Though the Judicious Spectator plays a central role in Nussbaum’s 
account of readerly activity and she explicates her view of the concept in some detail,61 Stow 
objects that she never answers Adam Smith’s caveat that adopting such a position “is perhaps 
impossible”.62 Stow’s concern is a more general issue he has with what he sees as the easy path 
taken in such discussions,63 where a theorist notes the potential difficulty in their proposed 
imaginative exercise without seriously considering said difficulties, as if noticing the problem 
were a sufficient answer to it. Stow’s charge of impossibility is a doubt that readers can in any 
robust way actually imagine vividly how it feels to be in someone else’s shoes while maintaining 
their objective detachment. He grants that Nussbaum might well appeal to her concept of ‘Fancy’ 
as precisely the capacity that both enables readers to adopt the Judicious Spectator stance and is 
also enhanced by reading, but this brings with it other problems, noticeably a certain degree of 
circularity. If, in order to become good at this kind of imaginative perspective taking, we need 
                                                
60 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Revised Edition. (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University 
Press, 1999), 118-138. 
61 Nussbaum, Poetic Justice, 72-78. 
62 Simon Stow, Republic of Readers: The Literary Turn in Political Thought and Analysis, (New 
York: State University of New York Press, 2007), 50. 
63 He also cites Rawls and his Original Position, as another similar example of this fallacy. 
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simply to read, all is well. But if we need ‘Fancy’, already sufficiently developed, in order to 
read from the Judicious Spectator position, how do we get more of it by reading?64  
If we understand Nussbaum’s Judicious Spectator as a success term this line of defense 
appears untenable on both sides of the equation. If the necessary capacity (Fancy) that allows 
readers to take up the Judicious Spectator position must already be possessed in order to adopt 
the position that gives us appropriate practice in objective judgment, then Nussbaum’s view 
appears to violate the general consensus among moral thinkers surrounding the principle of 
practical freedom (that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’). Further, if the Judicious Spectator position is 
understood normatively, then it seems strange to claim that our capacity for Fancy will be 
enhanced by adopting it while reading, since presumably to succeed at making correct practical 
judgments will already entail being sufficiently proficient at the appropriate types of relevant 
imagination.65 
Stow does think that there may be a non-circular path available to such an account, but 
worries that Nussbaum makes it harder than necessary with her ‘supply-side’ theory of the novel 
which seems ask much more of the Judicious Spectator position than Smith originally intended.66 
By ‘supply-side’ theory of literary uptake, he means “a theory that suggests that the impact a text 
has on a reader derives from the text itself and not the reader, and that furthermore texts have a 
                                                
64 Stow, Republic of Readers, 50. 
65 Of course this objection raised by Stow can also be applied to a descriptive reading of the 
Judicious Spectator concept. We might productively think of the difference in force of the 
objection as the difference between claiming the impossibility or the implausibility of a view. If 
Nussbaum is advancing an account of what it is like to read, then Stow's objection can be 
understood as a worry that such difficult imaginative perspective shifting seems unlikely to be 
what it is really like, whereas I read his objection to a normative conception of the Judicious 
Spectator as a much stronger claim of internal incoherence of the use of Fancy. Given the 
general consensus among ethicists around the principle of practical freedom this appears to me a 
larger problem. I take up Stow’s objection again below with a descriptive interpretation of the 
Judicious Spectator.   
66 Stow, Republic of Readers, 51-52. 
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definite and ultimately discernible meaning, one that allows us to describe certain readings as 
correct and others as incorrect.”67 Jonathan Rose has dubbed this the ‘receptive fallacy’ (i.e. the 
attempt to find the message that a work transmits to its audience by examining the text instead of 
the audience who engages with it),68 and it is problematic for Nussbaum because it appears to 
commit her to a ‘correct vs. incorrect’ framework for literary criticism. In fact, in her defense of 
her theory of textual impact she often implies that alternative readings are mistakes.69 This is 
contentious in part because of the overwhelming possibilities for textual interpretation,70 but it 
also seems like a deeply illiberal view of readers, since to fail to agree with Nussbaum’s ‘correct’ 
reading of a text appears to be a deficiency on the part of the reader instead of an alternative 
view.71 Stow notes the irony that one of Nussbaum’s stated goals in Poetic Justice is to force 
rational-choice economic models to accommodate differently situated persons, but “her own 
approach to texts is predicated upon the assumption that even such differently situated persons 
will come to an agreement on the meaning of a text.”72 
                                                
67 Stow, Republic of Readers, 4.  
68 Jonathan Rose, The Intellectual Life of the British Working Class (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2001), 4. 
69 Martha C. Nussbaum, “Exactly and Responsibly: A defence of Ethical Criticism” Philosophy 
and Literature Vol. 22 no. 2 (1998), 353.  
70 Rhonda Anderson, “Truth, Fiction and the Value of Literature” (paper presented at Philosophy 
in the Community, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, December 8, 2010). For example, Rhonda 
Anderson notes that authors often play with the conventions of the genre they write in as a way 
to deliberately alienate readers from characters for their own ends, and that focus on our 
emotional engagement with protagonists as grounds for criticism obscures this important feature. 
71 Simon Stow, “Reading Our Way to Democracy? Literature and Public Ethics,” Philosophy 
and Literature Vol. 30 (2006), 414. As Stow notes, “The ‘supply-side’ theory of the text is, 
however, not only methodologically problematic, in the context of liberal-democracy it also 
seems to be politically problematic. For, implicit in the claim that texts have clear meanings that 
they transmit to their readers is the assumption that a failure to see the text in the prescribed way 
arises from a deficiency on the part of the reader. This is, perhaps, no way to conduct our 
business in a liberal-democracy.”  
72 Stow, Republic of Readers, 58. 
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Though not strictly a normative reading of the Judicious Spectator, this underlying theory 
of textual impact employed by Nussbaum does contain the other kernel of prescriptive thought in 
her account, namely the view that novels have a particular meaning (which is to say, a reader 
could be mistaken about the morally significant theme of a novel). Leaving aside for the moment 
the implausibility of this claim as a fact about texts, it also serves to undercut an understanding 
of the Judicious Spectator as a normative standard. Nussbaum’s ‘supply-side’ view of textual 
impact (made clear in her discussion of her literary examples as well as her more general 
remarks on novels)73 leaves little room for the Judicious Spectator to operate as a standard of 
critical judgment, since the very portrayal of certain themes appears sufficient to force the reader 
to take them up. If Dickens writes about the terrible conditions of Nineteenth-century working 
class life, then readers apparently must come to see this through the specific viewpoint of class 
analysis. Thus her claims that the moral good of reading needs a careful selection of appropriate 
novels, and that we need to practice co-duction (i.e. the conversational comparison with other 
readers that ideally occurs in concert with our reading) in order to get the full measure of positive 
effect.74 Presumably these caveats on our reading practice serve as limits on the potential of bad 
literature to steer us to the wrong ethical conclusions, but this makes little sense if the Judicious 
Spectator functions as a standard for correct procedure in making such judgments. If the correct 
interpretation of any given novel is whatever the Judicious Spectator would identify, including 
instances of critical judgments about those very themes themselves, then the need to prune the 
canon of aesthetically pleasing but morally suspect novels seems wholly unnecessary. Given that 
                                                
73 Nussbaum, Poetic Justice, 2, 7, 19.  
74 Stow, Republic of Readers, 53. Though, as noted by Stow and others, much like Rawls and his 
reflective equilibrium arguments in A Theory of Justice, Nussbaum’s own conclusions never 
seem seriously in doubt in her description of this process. That she never seriously considers any 
other interpretations of her exemplar novels in discussing co-duction strongly suggests that for 
Nussbaum novels have correct interpretations.  
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Nussbaum does not think this is the case, it is hard to maintain a view of the Judicious Spectator 
as a normative standard.75  
Of course, we may fail at achieving any ideal standard of judgment, and we can read 
Nussbaum’s textual overdeterminism and her request for readers to practice ‘co-duction’ as 
antidotes to worries about potentially morally pernicious or harmful learning from literature in 
instances where readers fail to live up to the Judicious Spectator’s standards. Here again though, 
what appears to Nussbaum as a mutually reinforcing view of spectatorship and textual impact 
undermines an understanding of the Judicious Spectator as a normative standard to be achieved, 
since instances of failure prompt canon pruning and not appeals to the rational standards of 
judgment found within the Judicious Spectator. If the Judicious Spectator is a standard of correct 
judgment (or even a standard of correct procedure for judgment), then surely instances of failure 
to note the shortcomings of a novel’s themes by readers should prompt Nussbaum to show us 
what resources were available to them in the Judicious Spectator position that they failed to 
apply.76 It is worth remembering that the Judicious Spectator position is initially marshalled by 
                                                
75 Much like the Pappas objection discussed above, there is a real tension between understanding 
the Judicious Spectator as ‘getting it right’ and the surrounding claims that Nussbaum makes 
about what novel reading is like.  
76 Nussbaum, Poetic Justice, 75-78.  This discussion in Poetic Justice is hard to decipher. 
Nussbaum, when initially discussing cases where novels might lead readers astray, argues that 
this possibility should lead us to prune our list of appropriate novels (and to check our judgments 
with others through co-duction), which indicates a view of the Judicious Spectator as a 
description of what it is like to read. However, in the very next paragraph she argues that 
“critical inquiry about the literary work itself” is not only possible, but in fact essential, to the 
Judicious Spectator position, and that we need not “think the politics of a novel correct in all 
ways to find the experience [of reading] itself politically valuable”. This suggests that Nussbaum 
does think of the Judicious Spectator as an evaluative mechanism. In the subsequent sections of 
this chapter I examine the Judicious Spectator as a descriptive claim about readership and this 
view of textual impact in more detail. For now, it is enough to note that these two commitments 
of Nussbaum’s appear to be incompatible if we understand the Judicious Spectator as a standard 
of correct judgement.  
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Nussbaum as a way of explaining which sorts of emotional reactions we could safely include in 
rational deliberation and judgment.77  
Thus what looks initially like deployment of a theory of textual impact meant to buttress 
the concept of the Judicious Spectator appears to undercut any understanding of the Judicious 
Spectator as an idealized standard for judgment. Nussbaum is free to abandon her theory of 
direct textual impact (and there are reasons aside from incompatibility do so, taken up in more 
detail below), but then she is then left without an account of how one arrives at her strong claims 
about the specific political outcomes of novel reading.  
3.1.3 Problem of Plausibility 
Even if moved by Stow’s scepticism to abandon her theory of textual impact so as to 
preserve the Judicious Spectator as an idealized reader, Nussbaum faces criticism of the concept 
on other grounds. For example, David Bromwich argues that Nussbaum’s ultimate moral and 
political aims are poorly served by an appeal to Smith’s concept. Bromwich maintains that 
Smith’s Judicious Spectator relies on a kind of social and moral consensus that Nussbaum cannot 
avail herself of as a modern liberal who recognizes value pluralism as at least a social reality (if 
not a social good). According to Bromwich, Smith’s version of the appropriate sympathy for the 
plight of others found in the Judicious Spectator is impersonal and unspontaneous in its exercise, 
as “the whole artifice of spectatorship depends on an assurance – widely shared among the 
educated class of Scotland in 1759 – that the common sense of society is just.”78 Of course, no 
such consensus exists today, and so Nussbaum is left without a foundational assumption that 
anchors the claim to objectivity that is central to her use of the concept. Bromwich argues that 
                                                
77 Nussbaum, Poetic Justice, 78-86. 
78 David Bromwich, “Rat Poison,” Review of Poetic Justice, by Martha C. Nussbaum, London 
Review of Books, Vol. 18, no. 20 (17, October, 1996), 14. 
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Smith’s conflation of justice with a kind of ‘writ-large propriety’ confines the third-person 
perspective one takes in the Judicious Spectator position to a “projection of the first person’s 
idea of socialised [sic] good sense”, which seems an unlikely candidate for the kind of 
convention-breaking imaginative leaps of moral thinking that Nussbaum alludes to in her literary 
examples (and advocates for in her review of contemporary judicial decisions).79  
If we take the Judicious Spectator as a normative standard, this objection is best understood 
as a critique of the plausibility of the Judicious Spectator as an adequate ideal. The heart of 
Bromwich’s criticism is the claim that the Judicious Spectator position does not provide 
adequate tools to do the work that Nussbaum wishes readers to be doing (or at least simulating), 
namely forming emotionally sensitive and sympathetic rational judgments. It would amount to a 
rejection of Nussbaum’s grounding notion that removing self-interested emotions is enough to 
gain appropriate objectivity in making moral judgments. The kinds of normative evaluations of 
the ‘true view of the facts’ presented by a literary work that Nussbaum wants perceptive readers 
to be able to make, Bromwich suggests, cannot be made merely by appealing to a lack of 
personal or vested interest in the game. We are in need of more conceptual resources than a mere 
absence of personal favouritism. There is a lacuna in her argument between the Judicious 
Spectator as a conceptual framework that allows emotions to play a role in proper judgment, and 
her claims that the Judicious Spectator can give us the perspective (and the tools) to see that our 
prior theoretical commitments or socially constructed common-sense ought to be revised. 
At the very least, Bromwich presents a challenge to the adequacy of the Judicious 
Spectator as a normative concept for adjudicating between contesting claims to proper judgment. 
Since the Judicious Spectator does not provide readers a method for deciding between possible 
                                                
79 Bromwich, 13-15. 
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practical judgments, Bromwich concludes that it is not much help when faced with incompatible 
or competing judgments. In such cases the person attempting to read as a Judicious Spectator is 
left without resources to make clear which instances of sympathy are warranted and which are 
not, other than an appeal to either Enlightenment Reason, or to previously held standards of 
propriety. Nussbaum cannot defend the former without giving up a great deal of modern liberal 
pluralism, and her emphasis on the irreducibility of personal experience to a common measure 
when discussing utilitarian rational-choice models suggests that she is unwilling to do so. The 
latter alternative also appears unpalatable for Nussbaum, given that her exemplar novels are all 
supposed to show us specifically that the prevailing social wisdom portrayed within each is 
worthy of criticism and revision. She might be tempted to fall back on prior claims of enhanced 
capacities for sympathetic imagining garnered through reading, but as has been articulated above 
by Pappas, such appeals carry conceptual problems of their own. 
Bromwich, like the other critics discussed above, is prepared to grant to Nussbaum the 
plausibility of her general aim of tying our engagement with literature to our capacity for 
judgment (or is at least sympathetic to her project). However, he shows that appeal to Smith’s 
theory of spectatorship presents a poor model for readerly activity, especially given Nussbaum’s 
rather ambitious goals of defending a particular set of moral truths as growing out of this 
activity; truths that often appear to break the habitual forms of thought common to common-
sense judgments.  
3.1.4 Analysis 
 These three critiques of Nussbaum’s project present significant obstacles to 
understanding the Judicious Spectator as an ideal reader. Both Pappas and Stow draw attention to 
the tension between Nussbaum’s view of reading, her claims about the structure of novels (both 
 40 
remarkably deterministic), and understanding the Judicious Spectator as a success term. Such a 
view of textual impact seems to preclude understanding the Judicious Spectator as an idealized 
reader capable of adjudicating the merits of the literary work itself, since it leaves little room for 
the reader to do much work on or with the text in question. While Stow is right to charge her 
with a kind of illiberalism regarding divergent readers and their likely varied interpretations, the 
real problem for Nussbaum is not that she is an inconsistent liberal, but rather that her claims 
about the structure of novels and our imaginative engagement with them won’t produce specific 
liberal political commitments (even if we take her advice and restrict our reading list to explicitly 
activist novels). It seems clear that if we do understand the Judicious Spectator as a normative 
concept, this overdeterminism precludes understanding the Judicious Spectator as an ideal judge 
of the novels themselves. This in turn calls into question what connection Nussbaum sees 
between reading and moral judgment, weakening her case for a strong parallel between the two 
activities. Either she must give up her view of textual impact, or give up the Smithian version of 
the Judicious Spectator as a normative ideal.  
 The claim made by Pappas that Nussbaum has conflated two different kinds of 
imaginative abilities under the heading of Fancy also rests on a similar tension between the 
liberal policy outcomes that Nussbaum wants to attain and the theorized procedure of acquiring 
them, and Bromwich’s suggestion that Nussbaum is ill-served by borrowing the Judicious 
Spectator points to a similar conclusion from a different angle. For Smith, the Judicious 
Spectator stands as a moral yardstick, a normative ideal to measure the degree to which our 
judgments meet the proper standards of objectivity while still maintaining a focus on our 
obligations as inherently social creatures. Bromwich points out that this is because Smith is 
unencumbered by the notions of modern liberal pluralism, and so appeals to codes of social 
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civility can unproblematically stand in for rational norms on his account. Nussbaum is not so 
unencumbered, and Bromwich appropriately wonders why she would choose Smith’s view when 
much more subtle and nuanced accounts of emotions and reason are available within the 
philosophical cannon. Bromwich suggests James and Sartre in particular, but his suggestion is 
more important for its correct critical note than as a serious alternative proposal.80  
 Somewhat ironically, while stridently carving out a place for our emotional responses 
within a rational-obligation model of moral problem solving, Nussbaum leaves little room for 
those agents and their appropriate emotional responses to be significantly altered by the 
experience of responses to fiction, which further inhibits a reading of the Judicious Spectator as 
an idealized reasoner. A common objection among her critics is the charge that she fails to give 
any examples, even in her hypothetical ideal cases, of readers who have had their world-views 
significantly altered by engagement with narrative fictions.81 If we read her use of the Judicious 
Spectator position as a normative standard, then readers meeting the standard should be helped to 
see the lives of others in ways previously unavailable on the basis of mere social theory, and this 
new position should push attentive readers to see the error of their (presumably previously 
narrow) view of compassion for others much different from themselves. That she can only point 
to instances of novels that confirm her already existing theoretical commitments is a noteworthy 
shortcoming of Nussbaum’s Emotional Engagement View as it is presented in Poetic Justice. 
The discussion of ideal success cases in Poetic Justice centre exclusively on including emotional 
responses (governed by the rational appraisal of the Judicious Spectator position) as ‘reasons for’ 
theoretical commitments previously held. It is a rather mechanistic view of readers as well as 
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(Review),” Philosophy and Literature Vol. 21, no. 1 (April, 1997), 198. Stow, Republic…, 44-
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texts, and one that doesn’t do justice, I will argue in the next chapter, to the immersive 
possibilities for fictional engagement.  
 To summarize, I have outlined several substantial objections to Nussbaum’s Emotional 
Engagement View, focussing on the ways in which these arguments impact a potential reading of 
Nussbaum’s use of the Judicious Spectator position as a normative standard. I take these 
criticisms to pose a substantial obstacle to such an understanding, and have argued that in order 
to make the Judicious Spectator a coherent normative standard, Nussbaum would need to 
abandon both her theory of textual impact and her specific theoretical conclusions. Even if she 
were to do this (which would undermine the stated reason for her overarching project), the 
reliance on unexplained norms of rationality in the Judicious Spectator position makes it an 
implausible candidate for either ideal reader activity or as a candidate standard of practical 
judgment. There is still the option that Nussbaum means her explanation of the Judicious 
Spectator to be a descriptive claim about what it is like to attend to fictional works. I take up this 
possibility in the second half of this chapter. 
3.2 The Judicious Spectator as Descriptive Claim  
In the previous sections of this chapter I examined several objections levelled at the 
Emotional Engagement View, and concluded both that an understanding of the Judicious 
Spectator as a normative standard is incompatible with Nussbaum’s other commitments, and that 
it is implausible as an ideal standard of appropriate readerly activity. However, as explained in 
Chapter 2, it is possible that Nussbaum intends to use Smith’s concept not as a normative ideal, 
but rather as a useful descriptive outline of the activity of reading and its parallels to appropriate 
procedures of judgment. This means that arguments showing the implausibility or incoherence of 
understanding Nussbaum’s account as prescriptive do not defeat the Emotional Engagement 
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View entirely.  I will outline the criticisms aimed at a descriptive interpretation of Nussbaum’s 
Emotional Engagement View below. As previously stated, these objections are often aimed at a 
combination of claims made by Nussbaum, some seemingly descriptive, some normative. 
Several of the strongest objections to her view appear to me to overlap across the distinction 
between descriptive and normative versions of Nussbaum’s view. My aim in this section is to 
focus on problems for Nussbaum’s view as understood as a description of what our reading 
experience is like. I have grouped these objections into two categories of criticism: The first I 
have labeled ‘Interpretation Objections’. These are objections to the readings Nussbaum gives 
her case studies, and/or objections to the claims she makes on the basis of these readings. The 
second I have grouped together as ‘Empirical Claims Objections’. Several critics express doubts 
about the empirical claims made by Nussbaum about the effects of novel reading, or about the 
activity of reading. 
I conclude that although Nussbaum can avoid the sting of some of the textual interpretation 
counter-examples (as she is not committed to these particular novels or readings by necessity), 
related objections to the plausibility of her ‘supply-side’ view of the meaning of works and 
worries about self-defeating appeals to the aesthetic properties of fiction as morally significant 
are not so easily dismissed. These objections focus primarily on the plausibility and consistency 
of assorted political claims that Nussbaum makes regarding her view of the Judicious Spectator. 
I will argue that although these critiques show Nussbaum’s account to be problematic as 
presently articulated, they do not alone show us conclusively that an account of the Judicious 
Spectator position as a descriptive claim about the moral value of reading is untenable. However, 
in Chapter four, I will argue that Nussbaum’s view, even modified to address these objections, 
cannot account for an important facet of moral value found in literary engagement. 
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3.2.1 Literary Interpretation Objections 
The criticisms of Nussbaum’s readings of her examplar novels’ themes and intents can be 
delineated into two categories: disagreement with the specific claims she is making regards 
certain novels, and more general worries about the work these interpretations appear to be 
shouldering on her account. I will address each in turn. At the heart of these disagreements with 
Nussbaum’s interpretive claims is a more general objection that her example novels are both 
cherry-picked for specific, sometimes overhanded, political messaging (often to their detriment 
as literary works), and that her use of these works is self-defeating for her own political 
commitments.82  
Paulette Kidder has argued that although Nussbaum’s reading of her principal example 
novel, Hard Times, as a ‘deep attack’ on utilitarianism mirrors Dickens’ broader position on that 
theory, she “systematically omits” essential Biblical references and themes that anchor his view 
and give it much of its power.83 She grants that all literary interpretations must leave possible 
readings out, but argues that the Christian symbolism in Hard Times is so pervasive and integral 
to the major themes of the novel that to omit it entirely is to miss something essential about the 
book.84  
This sentiment is echoed by Nickolas Pappas who argues that Hard Times is a strange 
choice of novel for Nussbaum since, “its political agenda derives from a source other than the 
                                                
82 See: Gorman, 198. Richard Posner, “Against Ethical Criticism”, Philosophy and Literature 
Vol. 21, no. 1 (1997), 16-17. Richard Posner, “Against Ethical Criticism: Part Two” Philosophy 
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representation of characters”, namely a Christian mythology.85 Pappas points out that it is 
problematic to use Hard Times as a keystone novel for her account because it is precisely 
Dickens’ attachment to individuals that makes him hostile to any broader political analysis.86 
Nussbaum argues that we are compelled to reconsider social and institutional arrangements by 
our faculty of Fancy when engaged with the plight of the individual characters portrayed, but 
Pappas suggests that Hard Times is a novel hostile to this kind of reconsideration, which is why 
Dickens never arrived at any of the broad social policy prescriptions (and even expressed distain 
for social reorganization such as unionization) that Nussbaum thinks flow naturally from the 
novel.87  
Richard Posner disagrees with nearly all of her interpretive claims, submitting that it is 
only in virtue of several well-documented artistic deficiencies that one can draw the lessons 
Nussbaum does from the three novels (Hard Times, Maurice, Native Son) she considers in Poetic 
Justice.88 He finds her defense of Native Son and Maurice as exemplary works of literature 
unimaginable, arguing that it is only because their political messages cohere with her own that 
they get mention, placing her esteem of these novels well outside conventional critical evaluation 
of their merits.89  
                                                
85 Pappas, 290. 
86 Pappas, 290-92. 
87 Pappas also thinks that Hard Times as a novel is not indicative of the general features of the 
genre for this reason, and problematically so for Nussbaum, as she is left with a paradigm novel 
which is either hostile to her overarching political goals, or typical of novels in its suspicion of 
generalizable norms of conduct. 
88 Posner, “Against”, 11.  
89 Posner, “Against … Part Two”, 398-399. Posner, “Against”, 7. Posner also notes that the 
moral content of literary works may well agree with our current political commitments, but that 
does not seem to recommend them to us, citing Uncle Tom’s Cabin as an example of a work that 
“has not survived as literature…even though its author’s opposition to slavery now commands 
universal assent.” 
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The general point being articulated among these critics is that Nussbaum’s example novels, 
and the obvious lessons she thinks waiting within them, appear cherry picked. If the Judicious 
Spectator is indeed an apt description of the parallel between the activity of reading and that of 
moral deliberation then, Posner argues, it seems odd to have chosen only novels that explicitly 
(and rather ham-fistedly) reiterate Nussbaum’s own political convictions, as this undercuts the 
plausibility of the general parallel found in the form.  In a similar vein, Pappas’s claim that Hard 
Times is a strange choice as an exemplar novel rests on more conventional interpretations of the 
themes of that work that emphasize Dickens’ attachment to individuals in opposition to larger 
social or political movements. Thus Nussbaum appears left with an unpalatable dichotomy, a 
paradigm novel that is either hostile to her specific political goals, or a paradigm novel that is 
typical of all novels in resisting the alleged natural progression from empathy for characters to 
larger social reorganization. 
3.2.2 Analysis 
It appears to me that objections to Nussbaum’s particular interpretation of Hard Times and 
her other example novels can be granted, or contested, without rebutting the more foundational 
claims made about the Judicious Spectator as a descriptive claim, though not without cost. 
Nussbaum may concede that there are more apt readings of Hard Times than her own, or stake a 
claim to her own view as capturing the uniquely political perspective that is also present 
alongside other themes, since any particular counter-example from an individual novel will not 
undercut the underlying account of the activity of sympathetic imagination as such, or the value 
of emotional perception to proper judgment. This is not to say these objectors are mistaken in 
their view that Nussbaum has misread or contorted Dickens, or misunderstood the aesthetic 
valuation of certain novels, only that it appears that she could grant these objections without 
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altering her more basic (and general) claims about what it is like to gain imaginative skill and 
why that is morally and socially valuable. If, for example, she capitulated to Posner’s assertion 
that all three of her example novels contained aesthetic defects and she should choose other 
examples, Nussbaum could do so and still maintain that readers do actually engage with fictions 
primarily through non-self-interested emotional attachment to characters, and that this is morally 
valuable as a kind of practice run for proper judgment. It might be argued that the problems with 
her literary interpretations undercut the plausibility of her overall project, since Nussbaum 
presumably sees these novels as exemplifying what is reasonable about her depiction of reading, 
and does in fact wish to argue for a liberal, enlightenment view of human flourishing, not just 
any potential output from novel reading.  
As I have argued above, Nussbaum does appear to endorse what Stow labels a ‘supply-
side’ view of textual impact (that novels have a particular meaning and that novels induce 
contemplation of that meaning in their readers), and the objections raised above are clearly 
connected to this problem.90 However, if we understand the Judicious Spectator as a descriptive 
claim about what novel reading is like, Nussbaum’s assertions about the general form of 
imaginative engagement with literature and her claim that this engagement mirrors the practice 
of proper judgment could conceivably be divorced from her insistence on her political theory 
commitments as following from the themes present in the novels we read. In the section below I 
take up this suggestion as it relates to her claim that readers bring a general conception of human 
flourishing and suffering to bear upon the works they encounter.  
 
 
                                                
90 Recall that earlier in chapter three I argued that this ‘supply-side theory of meaning transferal 
was incompatible with a normative conception of the Judicious Spectator.  
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3.2.3 Empirical Claims Objections 
Nussbaum makes several interrelated claims about the way in which meanings and 
messages in literature are transmitted, about the structure of novels, and about the natural 
responses of readers to them.91 Specifically, she claims that novels give readers pleasure, and this 
fact about them is not independent of their moral operations or usefulness, since the very focused 
attention that entices us to continue reading is “itself a moral feature.” 92 Readers, for their part, 
assess the particular conditions depicted in novels with reference to “certain very general norms 
of human flourishing that are built into” their compassionate responses, which are highly 
cognitive and evaluative emotions on Nussbaum's account (and include Aristotelian judgments 
about luck, goodness and harm, and blameworthiness).93 Further, readers’ interests and 
emotional responses to these fictional depictions lead naturally (perhaps inevitably) to a kind of 
metaphorical imaginative leap, where readers consider the broader social or political climates 
that inform the specific characterizations of individual lives or circumstances.94 Finally, the 
activity of reading, “develops moral capacities without which citizens will be unable to 
instantiate the normative conclusions of any moral or political theory, however excellent.” These 
theoretical commitments will themselves have been influenced by our insights gained through 
reading if we are attentive and perceptive readers.95 
Several critics have taken issue with Nussbaum’s claim that novels engender these 
capacities. Pappas points out that Nussbaum has made a very strong claim in Poetic Justice (and 
elsewhere) about the link between novels and their positive social effects. Her initial claim is that 
                                                
91 See Chapter two, pg. 2-5 for a more detailed discussion.  
92 Nussbaum, Poetic Justice, 35.  
93 Nussbaum, “Exactly”, 325. 
94 Nussbaum, Poetic Justice, 7. 
95 Nussbaum, Poetic Justice, 12. 
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the sympathetic imagination receives its full content only through reading novels96 (although she 
vacillates in response to critics on this point).97 Critics have responded to this strong claim with 
the charge of instrumental use of art. As Pappas notes, the general problem with arguments for 
the social efficacy of artworks is that such accounts need to maintain at least some recognition of 
the aesthetic status of the art in question or else those works are “forced to compete with non-art 
over the turf of effectiveness.”98 If the good of novel reading is solely its social consciousness-
raising effects, then what reason do we have to prefer novels over other means that engender the 
same effect with greater efficiency? Nussbaum asserts that the efficacy of novel reading stems 
from its status as art, in particular the pleasure we garner in reading novels, a (perhaps) unique 
kind of apprehension of the situations and characters that Nussbaum repeatedly likens to 
friendship.99 
Pappas notes that if characters are good company (and analogous to friendships) because 
we read for pleasure, they have use to us. But, he asks, surely appreciation of others for their own 
sake (the kind of sympathetic imagination that is needed for real world interactions) is a different 
sort of appreciation than the selfish utility of the pleasure we receive from their company?100 
Pappas argues that Nussbaum makes this less plausible by attaching the relevant aesthetic 
pleasure to literary characters.101 She appears to have an internal inconsistency between the 
moral ideals we are attempting to cultivate with our novel reading (that of treating people as ends 
in themselves) and a kind of solipsistic (or at the very least supremely lopsided) friendship 
                                                
96 Nussbaum, Poetic Justice, 66, 72-74. 
97 Martha C. Nussbaum, “Exactly ”, 346. 
98 Pappas, 281. 
99 Nussbaum, Poetic Justice, 31, 35, 42. 
100 Pappas, 294. 
101 Pappas, 294.  
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predicated on our entertainment in the company of singular or outlandish characters who are 
supposed to bring us there.102  
Nussbaum’s second claim, that the structure of the novel or the necessary responses of 
readers to novels contain moral improvements waiting to be shaped into particular political 
commitments, draws criticism from Posner, who argues that if this were true in any generalizable 
sense, Nussbaum could have chosen much finer works of literature as examples without having 
to worry about the political content of their central themes.103  If, the very structure of novels 
tended to induce liberal political analysis and social action in readers, then where is the need to 
read books whose overt, and Posner claims, clumsy themes are these specific liberal 
commitments? Surely better quality books will take us to the same place if it really is the 
structure of the novel that leads to such conclusions. Relatedly, Piercey is prepared to entertain 
Nussbaum’s idea that our imaginative practice (exercised through reading) may well teach 
perceptual awareness and give us practice at looking for deeper meanings, but is sceptical about 
her assumption that such interpretations will always be positive, as cases of unreliable narrators 
and other literary devices might cause us to view others as always hiding the truth from us.104 A 
more extreme version of this objection is presented by Posner (and discussed by Stow),105 who 
proposes the idea of an empathetic torturer (citing the historical example of the well-cultured 
Germans who went on to become Nazis) to suggest that we might learn quite unsavoury things 
from becoming more perceptive about the lives of others.106 
                                                
102 Pappas, 294. 
103 Posner, “Against”, 16.  
104 Robert Piercey, “Paul Ricoeur on the Ethical Significance of Reading” Philosophy Today, 
Vol. 54, no. 3 (2010), 280. See in particular, footnote 20.   
105 Stow, Republic of Readers, 48-49. 
106 Posner, “Against”, 4-5. 
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Finally, Pappas’ objection (raised earlier in section 3.1.1) that Nussbaum conflates two 
different types of imagination (the practical or concrete and the theoretical or abstract) seems 
germane to her empirical claim that reader’s emotional responses to novels lead naturally to a 
kind of imaginative leap where readers consider the broader social or political ramifications of 
specific stories.  Conversely, Pappas argues that attention to any particular harm can obscure 
more general and non-descript social patterns or behaviours, since they are not as susceptible to 
keen awareness regarding individual details but rather require a kind of abstract thinking that 
contemplates the ‘individual in general’.107   
3.2.4 Analysis 
Considering these objections collected together, we can see that the force of each relies to 
some degree on the incompatibility of Nussbaum’s empirical claims about the structure of novels 
and the nature of reading with her desire to derive particular liberal political principles from this 
practice.  Much like the “Literary Interpretation Objections” it appears as though a general worry 
shared by several theorists finds its footing in the idea that Nussbaum’s ‘supply-side’ theory of 
textual impact is implausible. Recall that Stow, who articulates this idea most clearly, is sceptical 
that identifying a work’s themes or its author’s intent can reliably predict a work’s impact on a 
reader.  He argues that there is no indication in Poetic Justice (or elsewhere) that Nussbaum has 
seriously considered the individuation of readers’ experience as a potential complication to her 
strong interpretive claims.108 I have argued previously that Stow is correct in this assertion, and 
that Nussbaum’s commitment to a narrow and pessimistic view of reader’s capacity to assess the 
authorial intent or presented themes of a work stands in tension with understanding the 
relationship of reader to text as relevantly like the Judicious Spectator.  
                                                
107 Pappas, 285-292. 
108 Stow, Republic of Readers, 52, 55. 
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Posner’s objection that portrayal of certain themes is not enough to force the reader to 
endorse them is aimed at Nussbaum’s focus on particular moral and political knowledge to be 
gleaned from her exemplar novels, but that does not mean that he (or the other critics discussed) 
are prepared to dismiss entirely the idea that novels may engender in their readers ‘expansion of 
horizons’, ‘ increased capacities of perception’ or ‘changes in perspective’.109 Clearly readers 
must be invited or enticed into engaging in all of these activities, so the disagreement with 
Nussbaum is not over whether there is any form of connection between texts and altered 
readers,110 but rather a doubt that neither the degree of specificity nor the direct causal 
connection claimed by Nussbaum is plausible. In “Exactly and Responsibly” Nussbaum accuses 
Posner of failing to attend to the subtlety of her view. She claims to be making the broader point 
that our attentive reading of such works will always include our general concerns, “about time 
and death, about pain and the transcendence of pain, and so on— all the material of the ‘how one 
should live’ question as I have conceived of it”,111 not that ethical criticism means deriving a 
specific moral lesson from each work. Nussbaum is attempting to make a distinction between 
having a moral interest in the work and extracting a moral from it. This could be a good counter 
to worries about misreadings and also a possible answer to the objection of cherry picking. 
However, Nussbaum fails to counter the complaints of Stow, Piercey, and others who fairly ask 
for examples of works or interpretations that are not recapitulations of liberal theorizing as she 
provides no counter-examples of works where her reading is anything other than the extraction 
of a political moral with which she is already in agreement.  Nussbaum appears to have room for 
such a distinction to be made on her account, but can fairly be asked to supply the details of it.  
                                                
109 Posner, “Against”, 9, 19. Piercey, 281. Pappas, 284-286. 
110 Stow, Republic of Readers, 56.  
111 Nussbaum, “Exactly”, 358. 
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In this sense, there may indeed be room on her view for defending the general claim about 
broad judgments regarding human suffering or flourishing being a part of the background 
conditions that readers start with in assessing a literary work. We might well agree with her that 
attentive readers, when following the plot of a story, can and do make evaluative judgments 
about whether some action is harmful or helpful to that character (perhaps even about whether 
some unhappy end was tragedy or justice).112 But without further justificatory argumentation 
these judgements do not warrant the strong claims Nussbaum makes about political 
egalitarianism, claims that appear to ride on the back of this foundational description about what 
it is like to engage with fictions.113 This is the ground of Piercey and Posner’s scepticism about 
positive outcomes of increased perceptual awareness.  
If we grant that readers can and do bring background evaluative judgments to fictional 
works, that surely doesn’t get us all the way to modern liberalism by itself. We won’t come to 
specific interpretative agreements based on this characteristic alone, and thus her problematic 
reliance on a ‘supply-side’ view of message transferal remains problematic. Nussbaum half-
heartedly concedes this point in her discussion of ‘co-duction’ as a necessary step in the reading 
experience in order to get the moral goods she has promised, but devotes no time to explaining 
how discussion with others mitigates this over-extension.114 If various readings of a work are 
plausible between readers in private, why should this multiplicity disappear in conversation? 
                                                
112 I take the relatively strong consensus surrounding the puzzle of imaginative resistance to give 
some credence to this claim understood at a very general level. See: Tamar Szabo Gendler, 
“Imaginative Resistance Revisited,” The Architecture of the Imagination: New Essays on 
Pretense, Possibility, and Fiction ed. Shaun Nichols (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006), 149-74.  
113 Conversely some of her critics make equally implausible claims in the opposite direction. 
Posner’s own claim that we misread works when we evaluate them with any moral standards 
whatever must surely overstep. The basic categorizations of fictions into genres, comedy or 
tragedy for example, appear to rely heavily on this kind of background set of judgements held by 
readers. 
114 Nussbaum, Poetic Justice, 76. 
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Often discussion with others who disagree ends without one party persuading the other, or even 
having claim to ‘ought to have persuaded’ the other (had they been fully reasonable or some such 
condition). 
Nussbaum also appears unconvinced that such consensus will coalesce, which is why she 
recommends pruning the canon of illiberal works. But this suggestion itself seems somewhat 
incongruous with her prior claims about the structure of readers’ imaginations. If our 
engagement with novels has the tendencies she describes, then such a restriction on what we read 
will deprive the attentive reader of the kind of practice Nussbaum herself describes, of evaluating 
the works themselves from the appropriate distance of the Judicious Spectator position.115 
As I have argued above, an amended version of Nussbaum’s account that abandons this 
supply-side view of textual impact is compatible with maintaining a descriptive version of the 
Judicious Spectator as a description of readerly activity. Doing so would appear to mitigate many 
of the most vociferous criticisms of her view. We can see in these counter-arguments a tendency 
to run together Nussbaum’s claim about readers having content-laden compassionate responses 
(i.e. that readers bring to their engagement general normative judgments about what is harmful to 
a life), and her claims about the desirability or even inevitability of particular liberal and 
egalitarian commitments as an end product of our encountering them in fiction. Aside from the 
incoherence this creates, it is also surely an implausible view (for all of the above enumerated 
reasons). The bare fact of the multiple interpretations of most works should encourage Nussbaum 
to give up this view. Further, the Judicious Spectator position does not appear to necessitate this 
view of textual impact. Nussbaum could certainly argue that regardless of one’s commitments to 
any particular theory of textual impact, the Judicious Spectator stands as an apt analogy (or 
                                                
115 Nussbaum, Poetic Justice, 75-77. 
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‘artificial construction’ in her terminology) of the experience of engaged reading, and that 
attention to this similarity will show us the moral value available in the activity of reading 
fiction.  
The question left unanswered then, is whether the Judicious Spectator is indeed an apt 
description of attentive reading. Although Nussbaum’s own interest centres on the realist novels 
of the late 19th Century,116 her general claims about the structure of the novel and the structure of 
reader engagement with fiction cast a broader net. Her own protestations to the contrary, 
Nussbaum’s broad claims about the structure of novels as a form of literary work, and her claims 
about the parallels between attentive reading and the Judicious Spectator sanction an 
examination of other works beyond her own chosen examples to test the plausibility and 
accuracy of her claims. I take up a science fiction novel in the next chapter in order to work 
through these questions. Because some general qualities of the genre of science fiction are 
particularly apropos given Nussbaum’s stated project, I endeavour to show that even a generous 
interpretation of Nussbaum’s Emotional Engagement View leaves us with an incomplete picture 
of what is morally salient about literature. 
                                                
116 Nussbaum, “Exactly”, 346. Indeed, Nussbaum claims that her account of fictional 
engagement was only meant to pertain to her list of “pre-selected works”, and was never 
intended as a general account of literary engagement. It is difficult to make any sense of this 
claim, given the prevalence of general statements about the structure of novels, the structure of 
reading experience, and the role of the emotions in judgement are in Poetic Justice. To disregard 
her general claims and confine remarks only to what she says specifically of her three example 
novels would be to disregard three-quarters of the contents of the book.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
 
In the previous chapter, I outlined the objections to both a normative and a descriptive 
understanding of the Judicious Spectator position in Nussbaum’s view. I concluded that a 
normative interpretation appeared incoherent given Nussbaum’s other views about the structure 
of the novel and the structure of readers’ experience. In the latter half of chapter three I examined 
the most substantive objections to a descriptive understanding of the Judicious Spectator concept 
within Nussbaum’s account as articulated in Poetic Justice.  I concluded that these objections, 
though strong grounds to abandon certain portions of Nussbaum’s account, were not decisive, as 
Nussbaum need not retain her view of textual impact or her commitment to deriving specific 
political outcomes from literature in order to advance a descriptive view of readerly activity. 
More precisely, critics of her view did not scrutinize in any depth Nussbaum’s general defense of 
the Judicious Spectator as both an accurate depiction of reading and as relevantly similar to 
moral judgment formation in any depth.  In this chapter I will argue that the Judicious Spectator, 
focused as it is on filtering out self-regarding emotions as a standard for objectivity, cannot 
account for moral value found in reading that is primarily connected to moral reassessment and 
re-evaluation. I call this the moral good of ‘appropriate doubt’, arguing that good literature 
allows readers the opportunity to re-examine and evaluate personal, moral, and social views that 
they may not have thought through rigorously, or may even been unaware of holding. To make 
this case, I turn to the genre of science fiction and a case study of Ursula K. Le Guin’s novel The 
Left Hand of Darkness. I argue that Le Guin’s novel provides us with a concrete example of 
engagement with fiction that is, or can be, morally valuable, primarily through the self-reflection 
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it provokes. Further, I argue that this good appears unavailable if we understand the Judicious 
Spectator as a descriptive claim about what it is like to read. I attempt a charitable reading of this 
novel through Nussbaum’s Emotional Engagement View and show that, although she can 
account for certain kinds of morally valuable learning, her view cannot capture the moral value 
of the central conceit of the book. I therefore conclude that this shows her Emotional 
Engagement View to be an incomplete account of the possibilities for moral improvement 
through engagement with literature. 
4.1 An Alternative Proposal 
In the next section I will define what I take to be the central characteristics of the genre of 
science fiction, noting in particular the features of the genre that make it uniquely suited to the 
project Nussbaum outlines for herself at the beginning of Poetic Justice. In brief, I will argue that 
science fiction typically poses an opportunity for a special kind of moral development, the 
development of rationally appropriate appraisal and reflection on the concepts and presumptions 
of everyday experience. I will then examine in some detail the novel The Left Hand of Darkness 
by Ursula K. Le Guin, in an attempt to make the case that it is particularly well suited to stand 
both as a paradigmatic case of science fiction at its best and as the kind of narrative work we 
should most want consider if we are to take Nussbaum’s initial goals seriously. Addressing the 
critical response to The Left Hand of Darkness (or LHoD), I will argue that the novel cannot be 
dismissed as unworthy of serious literary consideration. Further, as this secondary literature 
shows, the central theme of the novel is exactly the sort of examination of a broad social problem 
through fictional engagement in which Nussbaum is interested. Finally, I will argue that although 
her Emotional Engagement View is meant to explain how readers effectively expand their moral 
reasoning capacities through their engagement with literature, Nussbaum is unable to account for 
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novels that are not primarily driven by emotional engagement with protagonists. I conclude with 
a discussion of the value of detailed and immersive hypotheticals (such as the LHoD) for our 
capacity to make appropriate moral judgments, arguing that Nussbaum’s focus on avoiding self-
regarding emotional ties as a measure of objectivity is too narrow and misses instances where 
what we are being asked to critically reflect on by the fictional work is not an otherwise 
unrecognized moral truth, but rather the presumptions that we bring to the text and which 
deserve our critical reflection. Nussbaum might well have an account that plausibly describes 
some limited set of novels, but she cannot account for the kind of self-reflective good that 
immersive reading offers, the ability to examine and recast (or even abandon) views the reader 
may not have even been aware of holding. My claim is that fiction opens up the possibility for 
self-reflective growth, and that Nussbaum’s focus on moral lessons external to the reader 
excludes this moral good.  
4.2 The Case for Science Fiction 
The science fiction genre, as critic Carl Freedman notes, is a nebulous one, with no entirely 
agreed upon parameters or definitions.117 This can be attributed in part to the relative youth of 
the genre (or at least of its being taken seriously as a genre), although over the past thirty years or 
so, an emerging critical literature has given us the beginnings of proper delineation. In particular, 
the work of critics such as Freedman and Darko Suvin, and writers such as Joanna Russ and 
Ursula Le Guin, has given outline to what I take to be the essential features of the genre. Suvin 
defines science fiction as a genre whose necessary and sufficient conditions are the presence and 
interaction of estrangement and cognition, and whose main formal device is an imaginative 
framework of an alternative empirical world. It is, he claims, “the only meta-empirical genre 
                                                
117 Carl Freedman, Critical Theory and Science Fiction. (London: Wesleyan University Press, 
2000), 13. 
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which is not at the same time metaphysical”.118 By ‘estrangement’, Suvin aims to pinpoint a 
representation that allows recognition by the reader while simultaneously making it appear 
unfamiliar, a detachment from the expectation of normal occurrence.119 What differentiates 
science fiction from other ‘estranging’ genres like myth, fantasy or folk tale, is the role of 
cognition, which Suvin sees as the rational or critical augmentation of imagination as a way to 
understand our own reality. This imagination is specifically of a cognitive variety, as science 
fiction demands a logical and philosophic consistency. Science fiction sees the norms of any 
period, especially its own, as a merely temporary realization of possibly limitless empirical 
contingencies and therefore open to cognitive examination and rigour in ways that myth and 
fantasy are not.120  
Russ suggests a similar conception when she characterizes the dominant indicative tension 
of science fiction as a “has not happened”. This includes events that might happen (science 
fiction), events that will not happen (science fiction-fantasy), events that have not happened yet 
(dystopias), and events that have not happened in the past (parallel-world stories).121 Suvin also 
argues that science fiction is not biased either for or against the characters described and, as such, 
is still very much tied to the notion of the centrality of people to ethics in that, as a genre, the 
moral significance of characters is found in their actions, not their role or placement in the 
story.122 Le Guin is keen to emphasize this aspect of the genre (arguing that it really only 
becomes a mature genre of literature when the centrality of character is acknowledged over 
                                                
118 Darko Suvin, “On the Poetics of the Science Fiction Genre,” College English vol. 34, No. 3 
(Dec., 1972), 375-378. 
119 Suvin, 374. 
120 Suvin, 375. 
121 Joanna Russ, To Write like a Woman: Essays in Feminism and Science Fiction, 
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fetishization of technologies).123 However, somewhat contrary to this view, Russ argues that, 
“science fiction’s emphasis is always on phenomena – to the point where reviewers and critics 
can commonly use such phrases as ‘the idea as hero’,” and further that “the protagonists of 
science fiction are always collective, never individual persons (although individuals often appear 
as exemplary or representative figures).”124  
 While the estranging use of the boundaries of scientific knowledge is central to science 
fiction, it is no less true that even in the cases to which Russ alludes, these collective protagonists 
are still protagonists in the essentially emploted way typical of other genres. In fact, they seem 
particularly concerned with the relation of persons to others, in that they remain science fiction 
narratives to the extent that they are exactly attempts at bringing to the fore (through 
estrangement) some specific contingency in what we take to be settled or immutable fact for 
closer examination. Freedman notes that, “the science-fictional world is not only one different in 
time or place from our own, but one whose chief interest is precisely the difference that such 
difference makes.”125  
 This feature of science fiction is specifically found in its otherness from our current 
world. Because science fiction novels present the reader with empirical descriptions of the world 
in which the story takes place that are both new and explicitly at one remove, the principles of 
ethics, science, politics, ontology and history are all presented in a manner that allows and invites 
critical evaluation, both for internal consistency (in an attempt to make it believable, even when 
strictly speaking, impossible) and also relative to the reader’s own situation. Pamela J. Annas 
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notes that science fiction is implicitly non-ethnocentric and dialectical in its vision of society: 
“non-ethnocentric in that a fundamental premise of the genre is that things-as-they-are should be 
questioned rather than merely accepted and described; dialectical in that alternate paradigms are 
played off against any given reality.”126 She concludes that the genre is structurally inclined 
towards revolutionary literature. Josh Lukin has argued that even reactionary affirmations of 
traditional social roles in science fiction novels participate in the deconstruction of their own 
positions because they must (explicitly or tacitly) acknowledge the existence of non-traditional 
roles when setting their world stages.127 Further, books such as Ursula Le Guin’s The Left Hand 
of Darkness or Joanna Russ’ The Two of Them specifically raise radical questions of gender 
identity, sex roles, and sexual stereotypes by postulating a sharp departure from our world and 
our current norms and conventions, requesting through the text that the reader give up the 
comfortable assumptions of their embedded social situation and through imagination examine a 
different possibility.128  
All of these features recommend the genre to Nussbaum’s project, which is explicitly an 
attempt to defend engagement with fiction as intimately connected to our capacities for moral 
problem solving, and to draw attention to the parallels between our ‘literary imagination’ and our 
‘public imagination’.129 Russ describes the common patterns of science fiction as ‘the dislocated 
protagonist’ and ‘the dislocated reader’, “that is, the protagonist who finds himself in a strange 
                                                
126 Pamela J. Annas, “New Worlds, New Words: Androgyny in Feminist Science Fiction,” 
Science Fiction Studies Vol. 5, no. 2 (July 1978), 144. 
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place or a strange world at the beginning of the story with no knowledge of how he got there,” or 
in the latter case, “the story begins as if it were a naturalistic story, and the reader must find his 
own way through the strange world”.130 These seem to me to be particularly appropriate modes 
of narrative structuring for a philosophical theory, such as Nussbaum’s, that is focused on the 
importance of the reader-protagonist dynamic. John Pennington has argued that science fiction is 
“by nature more writerly than readerly (to use Barthes’s terminology) because readers must 
activate the fictional worlds” more intently or fully than in realistic fictions.131 This suggests 
another feature of science fiction that should appeal to Nussbaum, who argues that attention to 
complex, detailed imaginings is part of the moral good of reading.  
Science fiction is, if nothing else, consumed with the use and expansion of the figure of the 
alien (or outsider) as a way to understand the human experience and our grounding value 
judgments. This makes it a particularly fruitful genre for encountering narrative models that take 
up, often explicitly and critically, many important philosophical questions concerning human 
suffering and flourishing, and often propose solutions to moral problems that are novel and 
challenging. As a genre it is unique in its invitation to readers, both in its request for active 
reader participation as co-builders of the worlds explored and in its possibilities for self-
reflection. These two characteristics are of course related. What we might call the excess work of 
immersion in science fiction novels that Pennington alludes to naturally opens up more 
possibilities for critical self-reflection, since to some extent there is more of the reader within the 
story. To the extent that we activate and populate the strange worlds we encounter in science 
fiction, we open up our own assumptions for critical reflection as well, since the invitation of 
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science fiction is always prefaced on the understanding of the contingency of the hypotheticals 
under examination. 
For a theorist such as Nussbaum who is keen to show the moral value of readers’ 
engagement with literary works, specifically arguing for a strong connection between vivid 
fictional depictions of other lives and an enlarged capacity to make proper value judgments,132 
science fiction seems uniquely appropriate to her project as a modern genre (particularly so 
because she prioritizes the ‘structural features’ of novels as a contributor to this process). As 
noted,133 Nussbaum does not see a need to defend her view of engagement as appropriate to any 
other novels other than her own example cases. I have argued above that this is an untenable 
position for her view, given the numerous claims she makes about the morally significant 
structure of the novel as a type of literary work, and about the general normative appraisals that 
are “built into [readers] compassionate response” to novels.134 In science fiction, we find a genre 
that appears to me to be particularly congruous in its general form and structure to Nussbaum’s 
initial outline of the value of fiction. Of course Nussbaum does not take up any example of 
science fiction as example cases when outlining her view. However, given her broad claims on 
behalf of the structure of the novel and the general character of the reading experience, I contend 
that her view ought to be able to accommodate exemplary science fiction novels if the Emotional 
Engagement View is an accurate depiction of readerly activity. It would be a strange theory 
indeed if the basic structure of the readers’ imaginative capacities and the general claims about 
appropriate kinds of objective judgment found in reading (both justified as broadly appropriate) 
only applied to a handful of explicitly liberal realist novels. 
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4.3 Novel Case Study: The Left Hand of Darkness 
 With this outline of science fiction’s parameters in hand and some reasons to suppose that 
Nussbaum’s account both should be able to adequately explain science fiction, and might well be 
buttressed by some features of the genre, we can turn to a more thorough examination of what I 
claim is a novel paradigmatic of the genre. Le Guin’s novel is an excellent example of how a 
fictional work can productively challenge existing categories of understanding. Further, I will 
argue that the ethical significance of her work cannot be fully accounted for on Nussbaum’s 
Emotional Engagement View, as it is primarily a text that asks us to engage in a thoroughgoing 
thought experiment that imagines seemingly immutable categories of identity (namely, sex 
and/or gender) as contingent.135 Unlike the realist novels of Dickens that Nussbaum champions, 
the LHoD is a novel with morally valuable insight that is not accessed primarily through a reader 
relationship of sympathy for, or judgment of, the protagonist. If we are to understand 
Nussbaum’s Emotional Engagement View as a descriptive claim about what readerly activity is 
like, the LHoD stands as a counter example to her narrow conception of those possibilities, 
suggesting at least that her view is incomplete.  
Le Guin’s novel is, like many good narratives, polysemous enough that even brief 
summary threatens to oversimplify the complexity and ambiguity of its themes and ideas.136 
With this caveat in mind, the plot of the novel can be summarized as a new world discovery tale 
of sorts. The Left Hand of Darkness is the report of Genly Ai, an envoy of the Ekumen (a 
                                                
135 And not one that easily allows for any specific normative judgements to be read from it, nor 
one that is essentially driven by an emotional relationship with any of its characters. 
136 Christine Cornell, “The Interpretive Journey in Ursula K. Le Guin’s The Left Hand of 
Darkness,” Extrapolation Vol. 42, no. 4 (2001), 317.  Cornell asserts that, perhaps uniquely for a 
text that has garnered such universal recognition as a paragon of its genre, critical responses to 
LHoD remain incredibly diverse, with “no agreement on central themes or even the basic 
trajectory of the plot.” A diverse set of rigorously defended interpretations abound, including 
disagreement about who the protagonist of the novel really is. 
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political and spiritual intergalactic United-Nations of sorts) recounting his mission to the distant 
planet of Winter (Gethen in the native tongue). Genly is sent to invite the citizens of Gethen to 
join the Ekumen, but encounters a series of political and cultural misunderstandings and is 
frustrated and alienated by the Gethenian social structure of shifgrethor (a complicated social 
system or concept of honour or personal prestige that governs interpersonal relations on 
Gethen),137 as well as by the androgynous nature of the people and the unrelenting harshness of 
the planet’s ice age climate. Political intrigue precipitates his travel from the old-world feudal 
kingdom of Karhide to the neighbouring nation of Orgoreyn (an early-modern-like bureaucratic 
totalitarian society), and later his imprisonment there. Genly is rescued from this captivity by the 
exiled former prime minster to the King of Karhide, Therem Harth rem ir Estraven (the other 
major narrative voice in the book), a Gethenian who supports joining the Ekumen, and the two of 
them embark upon a perilous journey north across a glacier (the Gobrin ice fields) in an attempt 
to return to Karhide. They succeed, and come finally come to know and care for each other 
during their journey, though Estraven is later killed, or perhaps commits suicide, in the attempt to 
return Genly to the capital of Karhide to fulfill his mission. Genly does eventually fulfill his 
mission and calls down his ship from the planet’s orbit, breaking a promise he has made to 
Estraven that he would not do so until his name was cleared by the King of Karhide. When 
Genly’s compatriots arrive they appear alien to him, as he has become used to humans without 
fixed gender. The story concludes with Genly, his official task complete but feeling incomplete, 
                                                
137 The Left Hand of Darkness, 14. Genly’s own explanation of the term appears early in the 
book, but it belies his frustration and ignorance of the alien peoples he is visiting more so than 
offering up an authoritative definition. His own growth though the arc of the plot gives him a 
much more complete understanding by the end of the book, though no fully fleshed out 
definition is ever provided. Genly’s definition is, “prestige, face, place, the pride-relationship, the 
untranslatable and all-important principle of social authority in Karhide and all civilizations of 
Gethen.” 
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trekking to the ancestral home of his now-deceased friend Estraven to give his journals (some of 
which serve as alternating chapters within the book’s narrative arc) to his family. 
Central to the movement of the plot is the thought experiment posed by Le Guin in this 
world: imagine a human existence without fixed genders. The citizens of Gethen are human in 
seemingly all other respects, save for their sexual physiology, where they are best described as 
sequential hermaphrodites. Instead of our continuous sexuality, they have a cyclical oestrus 
period of two to five days (called kemmer) in which their gender and sexual characteristics 
manifest as determined by hormonal negotiation with an interested sex partner,138 but not in 
predetermined ways vis a vis a particular gender (and without their conscious choice).139 If they 
become pregnant, hormonal activity continues and they remain ‘female’ for the gestation and 
lactation periods of reproduction, but return to their androgynous state soon after, and without 
establishing a physiological habit. Thus Gethenians can be father to some children and mother to 
others. The remaining time, Gethenians are completely androgynous, latent but physiologically 
completely inactive (this phase is named somer).  
This difference in gender and sexuality found on Gethen is the cause of much of Genly’s 
early misunderstanding and his anxiety and frustration in attempting to complete his mission, as 
the entirety of social relations and custom, the whole foundation of this civilization, is set upon 
different footings. In the latter stages of the novel, his growing acceptance of Gethenians as they 
really are allows him both a personal relationship of meaning with Estraven and the ability to 
                                                
138 The Left Hand of Darkness, 90. The third person chapter seven that describes Gethenian 
physiology notes that it appears as though it needs to be a reciprocal pheromonal arrangement. 
“Gender, and potency, are not attained in isolation.” This is significant only in that it appears to 
remove the possibility of unwanted sex for Gethenians, which of course also has rather profound 
social and political consequences.  
139 The Left Hand of Darkness, 91. Le Guin includes a caveat for modernity in this description, 
noting that in the some parts of Gethen artificial hormone therapy is used to establish a preferred 
sexuality. 
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navigate the social and political landscape effectively enough to complete his initial task, 
although it is not at all clear that either he or Estraven ever really come to understand each other 
completely. There remain even at the end of the book significant misunderstandings between 
them about what constitutes right or appropriate behaviour and action. 
4.3.1 Critical Response 
The secondary critical literature on The Left Hand of Darkness is thoroughgoing and 
thoroughly interesting, though somewhat off topic for present purposes. In this section I will 
confine my discussion to a small sample of the critical response in order to buttress two of my 
claims: that the work is a significant contribution to modern American literature that cannot be 
ignored as unworthy of attention by virtue of its genre, and that the novel’s claim to literary 
importance and value largely rests upon the central conceit of the novel. In short, the novel 
cannot be dismissed and its most valuable feature is its invitation to readers to engage in a 
detailed thought experiment about the contingency of their concept of gender.  In subsequent 
sections I will argue that the moral worth of this project sets out for readers of the novel is 
difficult (perhaps impossible) to capture on the Emotional Engagement View of reading. For the 
present moment let me expand upon my two claims for the book. 
Le Guin’s novel was critically acclaimed at the time of its publication, winning both the 
Hugo and Nebula awards for best science fiction of the year in 1970, and has remained a 
consistent science fiction top seller. Harold Bloom, in the introduction to the 1987 critical 
anthology about the novel he edited, claims that Le Guin, “more than Tolkien, has raised fantasy 
into high literature for our time.”140 Lewis Call hailed it as “a postmodern masterpiece” in “both 
                                                
140 Harold Bloom, Ursula Le Guin’s The Left Hand of Darkness, (New York: Chelsea House 
Publishers, 1987), 10. 
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form and content”.141  Justine Larbalestier called it a classic of science fiction, noting it is, “one 
of the most written-about texts in science fiction scholarship,”142 while Thomas D. Clareson 
declared that a clear retrospective of the era shows that Le Guin (along with Cord-wainer Smith, 
and Robert Silverburg), “opened the potential of science fiction more widely than any of their 
contemporaries.”143 Arthur B. Evans and R.D. Mullen’s extensive 1996 survey of North 
American university courses on science fiction showed it to be the most widely assigned 
novel,144 while Tim Tillack notes in his essay discussing the critical reception LHoD has 
received that it is, “one of the most read texts in the feminist science fiction canon, if not science 
fiction as a whole.”145 
The vast majority of critical response focuses on the thought experiment central to the 
book, namely imagining what human societies might look like without the social force of 
continuous binary sexuality. Le Guin offers us a concise summary in her own critical analysis. 
“The subject of my experiment, then, was something like this: Because of our lifelong social 
conditioning, it is hard for us to see clearly what, besides purely physiological form and function, 
truly differentiates men and women. … I eliminated gender, to find out what was left.”146 
Clareson claims that, “Le Guin goes far beyond the matter of sexual roles in order to explore the 
very nature of the society that would result from this biological arrangement. In short, with 
                                                
141 Lewis Call “Postmodern Anarchism in the novels of Ursula K. Le Guin” SubStance #113, 
Vol. 36, no. 2, (2007), 91. 
142 Justine Larbalestier, The Battle of the Sexes in Science Fiction (Middletown: Wesleyan 
University Press, 2002), 101. 
143 Thomas D. Clareson, Understanding Contemporary American Science Fiction: The 
Formative Period (1926-1970) (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1990), 261. 
144 Evans and Mullen, 524. 
145 Tim Tillack, “The Critical Reception of Ursula K. Le Guin’s The Left Hand of Darkness,” 
The Knowledge Eater, last modified October 2, 2011, http://goo.gl/uZX086 
146 Ursula K. Le Guin, “Is Gender Necessary? Redux,” Dancing at the Edge of the World: 
Thoughts on Words, Women, Places (New York: Grove Press, 1989), 9.  
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Gethen as an alternate model, Le Guin makes the reader ask questions about human society.”147 
Lewis Call argues that passages from the perspective of the Gethenians produce “a radical effect 
of cognitive estrangement” for the reader. That the Gethenians have a socially ubiquitous 
(though mild) heterophobia,148 Call thinks, “performs a vital function for Le Guin’s real-world 
audience, by undermining certainty and challenging the very concept of the normal.”149 Istvan 
Csicsery-Ronay Jr. notes that, “the process of transient gender-manifestation over which 
conscious will has little control makes fluid one of the stable elements of Genly’s understandings 
of humanoid beings — including himself”, which initially causes him great anxiety.150  He 
argues that Le Guin’s use of the concept of kemmer is more fulsome than merely showcasing this 
anxiety, as Le Guin constructs Gethenian culture around dialectical principles that seem natural 
for beings whose gender and reproductive identities are not fixed. As he observes, “Kemmer is 
thus also a heuristic device, posed to inspire real human people to think about their own gender 
qualities, and to imagine how much gender influences every aspect of culture and 
consciousness.”151  
Though not all critical response is so positive, discussion of the book is invariably centreed 
around Le Guin’s gender thought experiment in one form or another, with critics often 
underscoring in their interpretive disagreement the powerful pull of critical thought and self-
reflection that the novel invites in its readers through its narrative structure and central conceit.152 
                                                
147 Clareson, 260. 
148 The Left Hand of Darkness, 64.  See Genly’s overheard conversation on pg. 64 for an 
example of discussions of perversion and normalcy among Gethenians.  
149 Call, 92, 94. 
150 Istvan Csicsery-Ronay Jr., The Seven Beauties of Science Fiction (Middletown: Wesleyan 
University Press, 2008), 43. 
151 Csicsery-Ronay Jr., 43.  
152 Barbara Brown, “The Left Hand of Darkness Androgyny, Future, Present, Past”, 
Extrapolation, Vol. 21, no. 3 (1980), 227-35.  
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In particular, discussions of Le Guin’s use of common gendered pronouns by her protagonist 
allow critics to explore Le Guin’s nuanced and subtle use of linguistic assumptions brought to 
bear by the reader in engaging with the text. Nora Barry and Mary Prescott argue that in using 
Genly’s mislabelling pronouns (Genly refers to Gethenians incorrectly as either ‘he’ or ‘she’), Le 
Guin coaxes readers to see both the extent to which this society is truly other than their own and 
also underscores “the theme of Genly’s bias,” destabilizing the narrator’s true-view of the 
world.153 They claim that Genly’s own reported distain for and confusion about Gethenian 
‘feminine characteristics’, coupled with his attempt to chronicle accurately the world he interacts 
with on behalf of the Ekumen, “sets a trap for readers who have naturally established their own 
assumptions about gender in reaction to Genly’s,” which then “expands reader’s awareness of 
their own preconceptions and liberates Genly from the burden of having to explain the facts of 
Gethenian sexuality throughout the story”. This allows him (and the reader through him) to focus 
on his expanding conception of this normally concrete pillar of self-identity.154 John Pennington 
                                                                                                                                                       
Wendy Gay Pearson, “Postcolonialism/s, Gender/s, Sexuality/ies and the Legacy of The Left 
Hand of Darkness: Gwyneth Jone’s Aleutians Talk Back”, The Yearbook of English Studies, Vol. 
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Sarah LeFanu, Feminism and Science Fiction (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989). 
Jewell Parker Rhodes, “Ursula Le Guin’s The Left Hand of Darkness: Androgyny and the 
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argues that although phrases such as ‘the king was pregnant’155 might provoke an initial chuckle, 
“the phrase is a central metaphor for the reading strategy the reader is asked to preform.”156 In 
the novel, both masculinity and femininity are insecure positions, and “…consequently, the 
reader’s individual response becomes an integral component to the novel’s theme, a response 
that will be filtered through gender as the reader attempts to deconstruct gender differences.”157 
Further, because Le Guin reverses the typical science fiction conceit of the anthropologist-as-
hero, the genderless (or polygendered) are the norm on Winter and Genly is the alien, a fact he 
feels keenly much of the first half of the book. This forces the reader to follow along as the alien 
other, instead of from the position of normal or universal.158  
The novel is also disorienting in its shifting narration and perspective (with no less than 
five different narrative voices interspersed with Genly’s own unreliable authorial voice). Call 
describes this structure of the novel as “relentlessly experimental and fragmented” and lacking a 
narrative centre. The two main storytelling viewpoints (Genly’s and Estraven’s) are interrupted 
by a host of other narrative points of view and formats, which Call finds, “disorienting, 
destabilizing…and also remarkably satisfying.”159 Cornell acknowledges that the book “can be a 
frustrating experience for a first-time reader”, but this narrative pattern can be seen as an attempt 
by Genly (ostensibly the curator of the book) to reproduce “an experience for the reader that is 
an approximation of his own experiences.”160 Cornell’s posit is that Genly is himself a reader of 
the culture and people before him (as anthropologists are), and his own ‘textual gaps’ are at first 
filled by his prior experiences and conceptual frameworks in much the same way that readers’ 
                                                
155 The Left Hand of Darkness, 100. 
156 Pennington, 352. 
157 Pennington, 353. 
158 Pennington, 355-356. 
159 Call, 91. 
160 Cornell, 322-323. 
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confusion is likely to be digested. However, she argues that in the latter third of the novel, Genly 
comes to recognize that his previous ‘reading’ of his own linguistic categories and gender 
preconceptions onto the world of Gethen is his real roadblock, and substantially alters his 
approach, a process that is mirrored in more subtle ways by Estraven in the chapters he narrates. 
This alteration of views is implicitly asked of the reader as well.161  
4.3.2 Analysis 
Though much more has been written on the novel, this sample of criticism is representative 
of the larger whole in two important respects. Firstly, I take it to show a deep and continuing 
engagement with the novel as valued modern American literature. The nuanced and variegated 
interpretive approaches offered up as critical response (and critics admiration for the richness of 
the novel’s interpretive possibilities) show the work to be full of potential for readers interested 
in fictions that invite the kind of critical reflection on moral and political concerns that 
Nussbaum’s view purports to champion as worthwhile. I examined the critical secondary 
literature to establish that Le Guin’s novel is not dismissible as some intentionally perverse 
counter-example, contrary to the normal operation of reader’s engagement with novels. I take the 
above discussions to be such evidence. Critical analysis of the work does focus on the gender 
thought experiment Le Guin poses, but not to the exclusion of the development of character, plot, 
and other structural features consistent with the novel as a literary type. In fact, most critical 
analyses engage The Left Hand of Darkness under the general view that what makes the novel 
noteworthy is precisely that it is both an excellent science fiction puzzle and an excellent 
example of literary subtlety, depth and perception. Whatever one might think of the merits of the 
LHoD, it is not out of the ordinary with respect to the above-mentioned features of novels in 
                                                
161 Cornell, 319-322. 
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general, and as argued above, it stands as a paradigmatic instance of the science fiction novel. Le 
Guin’s use of cognitive estrangement, a dislocated protagonist, an alternate empirical world and 
critical attention to “the difference that such difference makes”, are not accidental features of her 
novel, they are the backbone of her fictional unrolling of a detailed thought experiment.    
Secondly, I mean to establish that although The Left Hand of Darkness shares these 
characteristics common to novels in general, unlike Hard Times, it is not so easily distilled into 
prescriptive moral exhortations, or even into a relationship of friendship or attention with the 
protagonist. As the secondary literature makes clear, the focus of the novel is the unfolding of a 
plot within a world that is both quite familiar in its modern human characteristics and 
simultaneously jarring and alien in its difference. More to the point, the critical analysis also 
notes the deliberate difficulty readers have in finding what we might call comfortable footing in 
the novel. Genly begins his narration with an exhortation not to believe his account as accurate, 
and then proves himself to be true to his word immediately with his pronoun misuse and 
inappropriate cultural overlay of fixed gender approximations for the Gethenians he encounters. 
The first several chapters alternate between Genly’s angry confusion, unexplained Gethenian 
myth, Estraven’s (initially) mysterious and perplexing mode of address even in private thought to 
himself, and third-person scientific descriptive language that also subtly calls into question the 
reader’s gendered assumptions with an expectation bait-and-switch.  The reader’s attention does 
not (perhaps cannot) focus on attachment to particular characters in the mode of a friend-like 
relationship because, unlike a realist novel, the setting is not a fixed background, free to be 
ignored while we follow the characters through the plot. When background assumptions of social 
organization are explicitly contingent, a good deal of effort is required of the reader to determine 
where she is looking and what she is seeing. Common markers of social interaction are not easily 
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digested or assumed and so readers are not free to ignore the background conditions of the world 
and concentrate on the movement of the plot as they would in the Dickens’ or Henry James’ 
novels that Nussbaum often uses as her examples. Further, the characters do not occupy the 
foreground in such a definitive way. For even if they are detailed and well-drawn and therefore 
demand from the reader recognition as individuals, they also stand, in virtue of their contingent 
empirical settings, as metaphorical exemplars of the ideas under examination (as Russ rightly 
notes).  
One way to summarize this feature of the novel is to note the extent to which rereading the 
first several chapters of LHoD after completing the novel (and thus being familiar in much more 
detail with the proposed outcomes of Le Guin’s thought experiment and in a position to evaluate 
the consistency and plausibility of said outcomes) gives an entirely new perspective to the events 
and persons described in a way that realist novels may not. In Hard Times, we might return to the 
introduction of a character such as Mr. Gradgrind and note the foreshadowing of his eventual 
rejection of utilitarian education in the kindness he exhibits to his children (being at odds with 
his supposed anti-emotional hyper-rationalist commitments), but our basic understanding of the 
significance and character of any social interaction is not up for re-evaluation. No rereading of 
Hard Times offers up the possibility that Bounderby’s cruelty is actually kindness, for example. 
In contrast, after fully immersing herself in the thought experiment of The Left Hand of 
Darkness, a reader returning to the opening third of the book will find that much of what appears 
to be (and is taken by Genly to be) coldness or even betrayal evinced by Estraven is 
understandable in radically different terms.162  
                                                
162 It might reasonably be claimed that other genres, such as mystery novels, also share this 
feature of pushing reassessment of ‘known truths’ within the story when re-examined by the 
reader. I would contest that what makes science fiction works rare in this respect is that these 
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I should note that in discussing these qualities of The Left Hand of Darkness (and by 
extension the genre as a whole), I do not mean to say that the characters are inconsequential to 
the novel. I take science fiction to have some unique characteristics as a genre, and have argued 
above that many of these should be seen as recommending the genre to Nussbaum’s project. 
However, I take it to be clear that in form and operation, the general characteristics of novels 
hold for science fiction novels. Genly and Estraven (and many other Gethenians) are vividly 
portrayed and their actions drive the plot in prototypical ways.  As well as being the embodiment 
of the central thought experiment, their complex portrayals allow the reader to contemplate a 
variety of other significant (and more traditional) themes such as the value of promises, the 
difficulty and grace of fidelity in the face of tragedy, and the struggle of the human being in and 
against a harsh and indifferent environment. Nussbaum’s initial recommendation for novels over 
other forms of writing is that, “literary works typically invite their readers to put themselves in 
the place of people of many different kinds and to take on their experiences,”163 and I think it 
should be clear that by any reasonable measure Le Guin’s novel does exactly that.  
We do come to know Genly and Estraven over the course of the plot, and may even care 
deeply about one or both of them by the end of the novel. In so far as Nussbaum offers us up a 
plausible account of the kind of aesthetic pleasures available to readers of other novels, I think it 
                                                                                                                                                       
sorts of altered reading perspectives are not obfuscated or hidden by the author in the text. They 
only come to the fore in virtue of a radical change in perspective undergone by the reader. 
Reimagining Genly and Estraven’s relationship is not a matter of perceptively finding the clues 
that were sprinkled through the first several chapters. The evidence, so the speak, is front and 
centre the entire time. What is remarkable about these early encounters is not noticing a slyly 
included clue of true motive cleverly hidden, but rather how obvious and upfront in presentation 
the social relationship is. Further, this change is not the result of a radical shift due to movement 
of the plot. The hero does not reveal himself to have been a villain all along. What changes 
significantly from first to second reading are the assumptions, presuppositions, and 
understanding of the role of gender in the attentive reader.  
163 Nussbaum, Poetic Justice, 5.  
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entirely possible to describe reader response to The Left Hand of Darkness in such terms. This 
relationship of ‘friendship’, as Nussbaum describes it, may well exist in relation to this novel, 
and even offer up an explanation for how readers access the above mentioned subsidiary 
questions illuminated by the novel. My contention is that it fails to capture the central moral 
significance of this work. Whether we care deeply for Genly or Estraven and see them as friends 
worthy of our sympathy or judge each (or both of them) to be unworthy of such sympathy for 
any number of reasons is, I argue, largely irrelevant to question of whether The Left Hand of 
Darkness is a noteworthy novel from the perspective of ethical criticism and analysis. In order to 
explicate this claim more fully, and to show what Nussbaum’s view of reading can and cannot 
account for, I offer an interpretation of the LHoD under Nussbaum’s Emotional Engagement 
View below. I will argue that even a generous reading of the novel from the perspective of the 
Judicious Spectator cannot capture the importance of Le Guin’s detailed thought experiment.  
4.3.3 The Left Hand of Darkness on the Emotional Engagement View 
It is worthwhile returning to the basic outline of Nussbaum’s account here in order to be 
clear about what kinds of interpretive claims are available to her. Recall that the essential 
features of Nussbaum’s view are fourfold: First, that reading is morally valuable because there 
are some possibilities that we cannot see if we only engage with theoretical or non-fiction works. 
These specific goods of narrative fiction include an emphasis on the complexity of the lives of 
individuals, a stressing of the internal lives of others as like one’s own in worth, and the idea of 
incommensurability when evaluating goods and harms across disparate circumstances. Second, 
reading is pleasurable and that pleasure is itself a moral feature of fiction, as our relationship of 
care (likened to friendship) with characters drives us to continue reading and stands as an 
appropriate relationship distance for proper judgment. Third, readers cannot help but bring a 
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general evaluative framework to bear on the worlds they encounter in fiction, one that recognizes 
in very general terms what is harmful or good in a human life. Finally, that reading allows a 
perspective that is at once deeply emotionally engaged and yet critically distant. This perspective 
is akin to Smith’s Judicious Spectator position, which gives us an appropriate standard of 
objectivity that removes self-interested emotional attachments while still allowing the right kinds 
of emotions to play their essential role in proper judgment. Since reading is so like adopting the 
perspective of the Judicious Spectator, we can gain valuable practice in adopting an appropriate 
standard of objectivity necessary for sound moral judgments by reading. I take these essential 
features of Nussbaum’s Emotional Engagement View to be potentially independent of her 
account of textual impact. Given these features, what should we make of the resources available 
to Nussbaum to explain the moral significance of reading The Left Hand of Darkness?  
Nussbaum might argue that her view does indeed capture the morally salient aspects of the 
novel. Readers can empathize deeply with Genly’s struggles in an alien cultural landscape, and 
yet remain critically distant enough (as Judicious Spectators) to disapprove of his early overt 
sexism. Readers could thus move through the plot with Genly enjoying his growing awareness 
that he had been mistaken to attempt to fit Gethenians into his own cultural assumptions and had 
thus failed to treat them as ‘ends-in-themselves’.164 They might even make the leap Nussbaum 
thinks natural from the particular case of Genly to some broad social principle of cultural 
tolerance. Such readers might rejoice at the bond of friendship and loyalty that grows between 
Genly and Estraven and weep at the latter’s death, coming to a further judgment of 
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condemnation at the kind of tragedies wrought by an honour-bound society such as Karhide’s. 
They might judge Genly harshly for breaking his promise to Estraven and calling his ship down 
before Estraven’s public honour was restored, or they might conclude that Genly made the right 
choice of valuing the good of many over the prestige of one, despite feeling like a betrayer of his 
word and his friend. They might even conclude that Genly’s mistake of impatience and anxiety 
when confronted with the sexually alien in the beginning of the novel shows us that human 
flourishing includes social space that is welcoming to sexual diversity. These sorts of moral 
lessons seem to be available on Nussbaum’s Emotional Engagement View.  
Clearly there is room for a Nussbaumean reading of the LHoD, and one that picks out some 
potentially salient features of the text. If Smith’s Spectator is not just enlightenment civility as 
Bromwich alleges, but rather, as Nussbaum claims, a standard of objectivity founded on a basic 
sense we all have of the general forms of human flourishing or harm and an appropriate 
description of the role of the emotions in judgment, then taking up the Judicious Spectator 
position in reading the LHoD will be of moral benefit as a practice run. Genly as protagonist 
comes to see his own patriarchal and gender-normative views as misguided prejudice and readers 
are in a position to evaluate this character growth. We can see the harm Genly does out of 
ignorance (to himself, the just and liberal cause of a galactic UN, and to his friend Estraven, who 
must endanger himself several times as a result of Genly’s ignorance), and conclude that this is a 
general sort of harm that might be avoided with appropriate social reformation. We can be 
moved empathetically by the growing relationship of love and friendship between Genly and 
Estraven across their vast cultural and biological divide and make some further judgments about 
the goodness of this character growth, or the virtue of friendship so sketched, and as noted, one 
obvious way we might imagine the move through Fancy from the particular case of the novel to 
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more general accounts of human flourishing is the above-mentioned prescription for more 
tolerance of sexual diversity (a liberal outcome of which Nussbaum would surely approve). 
4.3.4 Analysis 
These possibilities are not insignificant and offer up some options for a type of ethical 
analysis of The Left Hand of Darkness. They also offer Nussbaum some avenues to account for 
what other critics have thought important about the novel. Call, Clareson and Csicsery-Ronay all 
claim in various ways that the novel undermines reader's conception of normalcy and throws 
doubt upon present social organization, and Nussbaum might argue that her Emotional 
Engagement View captures the moral good as something like a political commitment to enlarged 
sympathy or tolerance for diverse gender norms and sexual orientations different from our own. 
However, I want to suggest that even a generous application of the Emotional Engagement View 
cannot account for the central conceit of the book, at least not with any depth or serious 
consideration. Further, the novel in its structure and content resists the externalized lessons that 
Nussbaum’s theory seems inclined to draw.  
For one thing, unlike the didactic novels of Dickens or Forster favoured by Nussbaum, no 
one is clearly downtrodden and in any need of our pity or sympathy simply in virtue of their 
social class or unfair circumstance in The Left Hand of Darkness, and thus the possibility that our 
sympathy coupled with a general sense of what constitutes harm will lead us to a prescriptive 
proposal for social or political improvement seems much more in doubt. Taking the potential 
good of sexual tolerance for example, the Gethenians we meet are not oppressed by a version of 
homophobia, and even Genly remarks that the mild forms of heterophobia he witnesses or 
experiences are mostly noteworthy to him because they upset his internal vision of normalcy, not 
because he is oppressed by it. In fact, one of the persistent and alienating features for Genly (who 
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is our stand-in on this world, being the only fixed gender being) is that his usual ability to 
differentiate and perhaps segregate (socially and politically) women from men is lost.165 Genly is 
himself, despite being in a position of forced vulnerability (being alone, unarmed, and utterly 
alien), not mistreated in virtue of his fixed gender. He is certainly socially adrift and alienated by 
his status as abnormal, but this is largely his doing. Genly's unwillingness (or inability) to discard 
his own preconceptions of 'normal' social relationships and power imbalances based on sex and 
gender categories is the primary cause of his hardship in the first third of the book.  
Moreover, none of these potential lessons appear to capture what is truly attractive about 
the book. As several commentators note, the pull of the novel is not a particular attachment to 
any character’s plight (and in fact there is some disagreement of who is even properly referred to 
as the protagonist of the story) so much as it is the unsettling (yet satisfying) confrontation the 
reader is invited to have with their own underlying assumptions and understanding of gender. 
Genly and Estravan are well drawn as characters in that they are three dimensional and 
believable, and we as readers do care for and about them, but the force of the novel’s central 
ideas and themes are not carried by their personalities or particularities, nor by our attachment to 
them. One can be unwilling to invest in their personal struggles, or frustrated by and 
unsympathetic to one or the other or both, and still be deeply engaged with the novel. The 
movement of these characters through the plot is not of utmost significance to the book (and in 
fact, the plot itself, if understood strictly as what Genly does and what happens to him, is rather 
pedestrian). 
                                                
165 It would also be misplaced to condemn Genly for his homophobia, as he genuinely attempts 
from the very outset of his tale to accept Gethenians as they are. That he is unsuccessful initially 
is not obviously because he is narrow-minded, it is because he cannot really engage in reflection 
of the content of his own conceptual framework until he is more familiar with how it does not fit.   
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What Le Guin’s novel does force us consider is what human civilization might look like 
without the social and political force of our gender relations constantly at play. The individual 
reader is pressed to think through how much of their social interaction and even consciousness of 
others is conditioned by potentially contingent categories of gender.  Nussbaum’s Emotional 
Engagement View omits these kinds of moral considerations and potential benefits from reading 
fiction. Because there is little room on her view for readers to engage with novels in ways that 
are not principally tied to emotional engagement with protagonists, Nussbaum does not present 
us with much in the way of conceptual resources to account for such morally salient features of 
fictional works. Surely it is too strong to claim that all of the potentially valuable moral 
improvements found in fiction must be garnered through this particular emotional framework of 
protagonist friendship.  
More importantly, Nussbaum’s focus on the relationship of reader to protagonist leaves her 
Emotional Engagement View ill-equipped to countenance the extent to which our engagement 
with literature is really an engagement with our own self-identities, and not the external world 
(be it the fictional world of the novel, or the imaginative leap we take through Fancy to overlay 
relevant similarities onto our own depiction of the world). This leaves little room to explore what 
the potential consequences of good literature might be for our ability to accurately reflect upon 
ourselves, and to revise our self-conceptions, independent, in some sense, of whether we approve 
of the actions of another or not. In short the Emotional Engagement view omits what we might 
deem the potential for literature to pose to us through descriptively rich fictional worlds, 
compelling philosophical problems in more abstract terms. That science fiction is likely to 
present such moral conundrums and questions to readers in the form of immersive hypotheticals 
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more cognitive in nature instead of invitations of friendship and empathy does not lessen its 
potential moral benefit.  
I noted earlier in Chapter four that a common complaint against Nussbaum was that she 
appeared to only be interested in works that confirmed her prior theoretical commitments. A 
related complaint is enunciated by Stow when he remarks that, “it is perhaps most telling, 
however, that Nussbaum never once gives an account of a book which has fundamentally altered 
her world vision.”166 This is not surprising, I contend, given the direction of gaze in her theory. 
Nussbaum’s view of reading as akin to adopting the Judicious Spectator position suggests that 
she primarily sees the activity of imagination found with fictional works to be one of a specific 
sort of contrast and comparison (of the fictional world with the real world) that is outwardly 
focused. Such a narrow conception of the possibilities for our imaginative engagement preclude 
the rich potential found in science fictions like Le Guin’s that ask us to re-evaluate our basic 
assumptions about what is fixed and what is contingent in the human experience. It is a marked 
shortcoming of a view that purports to champion literature as a path to improved moral judgment 
that there appears to be no room for reading to be self-transformative. If the only moral 
transformation available to readers is the acquisition of emotionally compelling anecdotes to help 
apply existing theoretical commitments to public policy, we may doubt Nussbaum’s original 
claim that non-fictional treatises are inadequate to fully explore our ethical commitments. I think 
this is part explained by Nussbaum’s own claim that readers cannot help but bring a general 
evaluative framework to the novels they read about what is harmful or helpful to a human life. 
This claim does appear intuitively plausible, as I have argued above, but it should not preclude 
the possibility that engagement with fiction will alter the parameters of such evaluative 
                                                
166 Simon Stow, “Unbecoming Virulence: The Politics of the Ethical Criticism Debate,” 
Philosophy and Literature Vol. 24 no. 1 (2000), 194. 
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frameworks themselves. Indeed, good science fiction such as The Left Hand of Darkness 
challenges readers to re-evaluate their own presuppositions about categories of human 
experience, such as the fluidity or fixedness of gender, which may play a foundational role in 
such evaluative judgments.  
The objections to Nussbaum’s Emotional Engagement View discussed in chapter three 
suggested an incompatibility between her conception of the Judicious Spectator as a description 
of readerly activity and her view of textual impact, which many critics argued led to overly 
strong, implausible or unjustified claims about specific lessons or outcomes from reading certain 
novels. I have argued that, further to this worry, even if we separate the Judicious Spectator view 
from her theory of textual impact, we are left without the resources to understand invitations 
from fictional works that are not primarily emotional in nature and directed towards social and 
political outcomes. Fictions like The Left Hand of Darkness resist prescriptive comparisons 
between the world depicted and the world of the reader, instead asking readers to re-evaluate 
their own underlying assumptions, or to reflect upon the extent to which categories usually taken 
to be foundational building blocks to more specific political outcomes might themselves be 
worth further reflection. This appears to me to illuminate a problem with the plausibility of 
understanding the Judicious Spectator as an adequate description of what it is like to engage with 
fictional works. Further it misses an important potential moral good of engagement with fiction, 
that of personal revaluation.  
To summarize, by adopting a view of objectivity that is focused on eliminating self-
regarding emotions and further the position that this view captures the moral significance of 
reading, Nussbaum leaves her Emotional Engagement View without the conceptual resources to 
acknowledge the possibility that some engagement with literature is primarily an act of self-
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reflection, and not an exercise in comparison between the external social world of the text and 
the external social world of the reader. 167 Specifically, I have argued that science fictions like Le 
Guin’s invite in their readers’ critical revaluations and do not conclude with any particular moral 
precept or public policy change as an obvious outcome. The themes identified by critics such as 
Csicsery-Ronay, Call, Pennington, and Barry and Prescott as central to the novel are questions 
about the gender constructs we encounter in our societies and our very self-identities, their 
influence and pervasiveness, their contingency or fixedness, and the possibilities for active 
deconstruction of the basic pillars of one’s own self-identity by encountering others who are 
radically different. Nussbaum’s Emotional Engagement View cannot account for this and this is 
a real shortcoming of her view.  
In this chapter I have argued that Nussbaum’s use of the Judicious Spectator concept as a 
description of what it is like to read, and the parallels readerly activity has with appropriate 
moral judgment, are at best incomplete. In order to buttress this claim, I examined the genre of 
science fiction, arguing that the essential features of the genre recommended science fiction 
novels to Nussbaum’s project of defending literature as morally valuable. However, a detailed 
case study of a paradigmatic science fiction novel, Le Guin’s The Left Hand of Darkness, 
revealed that Nussbaum’s description of the potential moral benefit of fictional engagement was 
incomplete. I attempted to outline a charitable interpretation of the LHoD on Nussbaum’s 
Emotional Engagement View, and concluded that though Nussbaum’s description of what it is 
like to read could capture some morally salient features of the novel, it left no room for readers 
to engage with the central conceit of the novel, which is itself an invitation for re-evaluation and 
                                                
167 Another way to understand this objection is to say that Nussbaum cannot account for the 
possibility that the ‘general norms of human flourishing’ she thinks readers bring to bear in their 
engagement with novels might themselves be up for analysis and evaluation.  
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reflection on the readers’ own self-identity. In the next chapter I outline several reasons we have 
to think that this kind of reflection is morally valuable.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
 
5.1 The Value of Appropriate Doubt 
 In the previous chapter I argued that Nussbaum’s Emotional Engagement View did not 
accurately capture the possibilities for engagement with fictional works. Of course this fact alone 
does not explain how those alternative possibilities for understanding readerly activity are 
morally significant. In this section I want to sketch in brief the view that reflection on one’s own 
foundational beliefs about what is and is not contingent in human experience is itself morally 
valuable. I should note that these are not fully formed arguments rigorously defended from all 
potential objections. I intend this section primarily to be a suggestion of potential avenues of 
further research on the topic at hand, a roadmap of sorts for extending this line of inquiry. To that 
end, I will outline two different accounts of how we might understand the moral value of 
reading, Paul Ricoeur’s theory of narrative identity and Christine Korsgaard’s contention that we 
have a moral obligation to pursue certain kinds of self-reflection.  
Ricoeur has argued that our self-identities function in ways remarkably similar to the kind 
of literary engagement I have suggested in the previous chapter and that as a consequence our 
basic practical identities are open to expansion (or contraction) depending on our ability to 
engage with hypothetical alternatives of the sort Le Guin’s novel offers.168 Ricoeur’s 
characterization of reading is that engagement with texts open up a dialectical relationship 
                                                
168 Paul Ricoeur, “Life in Quest of Narrative,” On Paul Ricoeur: narrative and interpretation, 
(London: Routledge, 1991), 26-31. 
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between the ‘world of the text’ and the ‘world of the reader’.169 He insists that what is up for 
grabs for readers is no less than their ‘horizons of possibility’, by which he means roughly that 
the new and previously unthought-of possible modes of being in the world that readers meet in 
fiction extend the options for understanding their own identities as alterable, perhaps in ways that 
did not seem possible previous to such encounters. Ricoeur suggest that we do not know 
ourselves immediately, but only indirectly, through our engagement with what he calls ‘the 
cultural signs’, which is his shorthand for the complicated interaction between readers and the 
forces of literary tradition and the symbolic markers and signposts found therein. For Ricoeur, 
the existential possibilities offered up in fictional narratives are concrete in the sense of outlining 
real alternatives, but such possible worlds are very much constituted by readers’ interpretative 
activity in concert with the text. As he says, “narrative mediation underlies this remarkable 
characteristic of self-knowledge-- that it is self-interpretation.”170 Arguably our self-identity is 
morally significant in no small part because it appears to ground what we think of as possible 
kinds of social, political and moral behaviours available to us.  
To take Le Guin’s novel again as an example, readers of The Left Hand of Darkness, if 
they have engaged fully with the thought experiment of the novel, will have not only read about 
characters to whom they have an emotional attachment, they will have expanded their own self-
awareness. What might previously have been thought of as a fixed category of understanding 
                                                
169 It should be noted that in his description of this relationship of readers and texts, Ricoeur 
emphatically asserts the thickness of his conception of texts. Ricoeur, “Life in Quest of 
Narrative”, 26. “To speak of a world of the text is to stress the feature belonging to every literary 
work of opening before it a horizon of possible experience, a world in which it would be possible 
to live. A text is not something closed in upon itself, it is the projection of a new universe distinct 
from that in which we live. To appropriate a work through reading is to unfold the world horizon 
implicit in it which includes the actions, the characters and the events of the story told.” 
170 Paul Ricoeur, “Narrative Identity,” On Paul Ricoeur: Narrative and Interpretation (London: 
Routledge, 1991), 198.  
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(rigid gender roles) has been opened up for contemplation and questioning, both about reader’s 
own self-understanding and also about their previously held convictions or beliefs that rely upon 
understanding others through the lens of rigid gender roles as a fact about the world.  
As I have argued in the previous chapter, the moral good of novel reading is unlikely to be 
as concretely prescriptive as Nussbaum’s suggestion of a particular moral precept such as ‘don’t 
discriminate based on gender’. Ricoeur offers us up a more plausible alternative understanding of 
why this kind of literary engagement is valuable, one that recognizes the complex and active role 
reader’s own interpretations play in any discoveries made within the text and also gives us some 
tools for understanding how literature might significantly alter engaged readers in morally 
significant ways. Piercey has argued that this very feature of Ricoeur’s thought is of particular 
value for understanding the ethical dimension of engagement with literature, claiming that, “the 
most noticeable effect that narratives have on reality is to change those who read them; and they 
change readers by showing readers something, revealing something that may have gone 
unnoticed before the text was read.”171  
This view of our engagement with fiction as an invitation to compare and contrast literary 
works with one’s own understood horizon of experience (or understanding of what is essential 
and what is contingent) also has considerable overlap with some other important theorizing about 
moral obligation stemming from an agent’s self-understood identity. Notably, Christine 
Korsgaard’s account of the sources of our moral obligations in her work, The Sources of 
Normativity, addresses this topic in some detail.172  
Korsgaard argues that it is a fact about human beings that they are reflective, self-
                                                
171 Piercey, 284. 
172 Christine M Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996), 100-130. 
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conscious creatures. She takes this fact to show that it is impossible for humans to be and act in 
the world without “a description under which you find your life to be worth living and your 
actions to be worth undertaking.”173 Since, through reflection, we are forced to act for reasons 
(being unable to act unreflectively on our desires), Korsgaard thinks that it is our practical 
identity (our self-conception as being this kind of a person rather than that, or belonging to this 
kind of community) that grounds our practical reasoning process. When we find ourselves 
thinking that we have an obligation not to do some particular thing, Korsgaard argues it is 
because doing that thing would violate our conception of ourselves, which is to say, it would 
damage our practical identity. When doing such actions would seem to us to be like a kind of 
death (a violation of the deep or essential characteristics of our practical identity), we find 
ourselves faced with unconditional obligations.174 
Korsgaard’s view of obligations as stemming from a person’s practical identity needs at a 
minimum for humans to be capable theoretical reasoners, that they be able to see that the 
consequences of doing or not doing some action interact with or impact on conceptual 
descriptions of ourselves as belonging to a certain class or type, or of being a creature with 
certain characteristics and not others. In particular, instances of conflicting obligations on 
Korsgaard’s account appear to require attempting to see what the potential outcomes of very 
different practical identities would be. For example, a person who identifies as a loving parent 
might feel a strong obligation to purchase the toys their child desires, while also identifying as a 
social justice advocate, and therefore feel a countermanding obligation to avoid purchasing 
environmentally destructive throwaway consumer goods from exploitative international toy 
companies. In order to resolve such a conflict, it seems plausible to suggest that what a person 
                                                
173 Korsgaard, 101. 
174 Korsgaard, 102. 
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does is to imagine both outcomes, (to purchase the toys or not) to ‘try them on’ so to speak, in 
order to evaluate the pull of each obligation.   
 I want to suggest that this explanation plausibly relies on moral reasoners using the same 
kinds of imaginative capacities that we use when engaged in alternative fictional worlds. In cases 
such as The Left Hand of Darkness, readers engagement with the central conceit of the novel is 
in some important respects a request by the fictional world to imagine the consequences of much 
more fluid gender and reproductive roles on the organization of cultures. This request has 
abstract or theoretical consequences for social organization of course, but, as has been noted by 
Nussbaum and others, the form of novels is one of personal address. The invitation to imagine 
the world as otherwise is, as Ricoeur suggests, very intimately tied up with our own self-
understanding.  
I want to make clear that I am not defending Korsgaard’s understanding of our moral 
obligations as necessarily correct. My suggestion is simply that if we do conceive of our moral 
obligations as stemming from a capacity to imagine our self-identities as quite different from 
their present state, and if we think, as Nussbaum, Stow, Ricoeur and many others do, that such 
imaginative capacities might be productively exercised, then we have good reasons to think of 
engagement with fiction as morally valuable. Understanding the value of fictional works as not 
merely the exercise or practising of appropriate moral sentiment, but as instances of ‘thinking 
through’ potential alternative practical identities provides a reason to think of such fictional 
engagement as retaining a moral value. In fact, contra Nussbaum’s intuition that realist novels 
provide the most appropriate fictional fodder for moral improvement, understanding this broader 
moral value of engagement with fiction may point to a specific sort of literature that has 
historically been marginalized by literary critics and scholars as ‘non-serious’ in nature (e.g., the 
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genre of science fiction). 
5.2 Conclusions 
It is worth re-examining the argument I have made, in order to be clear about the limits of 
its force. I began this study with a detailed account of Nussbaum’s defense of literature as a 
morally valuable method of exercising or practising practical moral judgment formation in 
chapter two. Nussbaum makes several strong claims on behalf of literature, namely that it 
strengthens our capacity for fancy, allowing us to perceive the actions of others in more generous 
ways, that it acts as a kind of practice for practical judgment formation, that is shows us the 
appropriate place for our emotions in proper judgment, engaged, but not overwhelming our 
rational powers. Many of these claims are tied together in her discussion of the Judicious 
Spectator concept, a framework for understanding the appropriate measure of emotional 
engagement that is still congruent with a standard of objectivity that befits our intuitions about 
correct moral judgments. I have argued that although Nussbaum offers us persuasive reasons to 
include emotional perceptions in any complete account of rational judgment, her use of the 
Judicious Spectator concept as a description of appropriate rational judgment is unclear and 
possibly internally inconsistent. More specifically, I have argued that Nussbaum is unclear about 
whether she means to adopt the Judicious Spectator as a normative standard or whether she 
means to argue that the Judicious Spectator stands as an apt and useful descriptive analogy for 
what reading fiction is like. In either instance, she undermines the persuasiveness of her related 
claims about the nature of reading and the structure of novels.  
In the third chapter, I undertook a thorough examination of the consequences of either 
proposed understanding of the Judicious Spectator (as a normative standard or as a descriptive 
claim). I concluded that Nussbaum could not consistently hold the Judicious Spectator as a 
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normative standard of judgment and maintain her other claims about the nature of literary 
engagement. Specifically, Nussbaum’s own account of textual impact and her proposed practical 
consequences of reading do not square with understanding the adoption of Judicious Spectator 
perspective as an idealized judgment procedure. Further, I argued that the Judicious Spectator as 
outlined by Nussbaum lacked the conceptual mechanics to make it a plausible normative 
standard. 
Having closed off that avenue, I proceeded to assess the plausibility of understanding 
Nussbaum’s account as a description of the activity of reading, surveying the critical literature in 
order to evaluate the internal consistency of Nussbaum’s claims. I concluded that although 
Nussbaum’s literary interpretations are implausible in some respects, she might choose to 
abandon her view of textual impact to avoid such criticisms and still maintain a coherent 
descriptive picture of readerly activity. I argued that although Nussbaum would need to abandon 
many of her empirical claims about the structural features of novels and about readers’ 
experiences in order to maintain a defense of the Judicious Spectator as the best description of 
the activity of engaging with fiction, the available criticisms of her account did not show that 
such a defense was inconsistent or untenable.  
In Chapter four I turned to an alternative genre of popular fictional narrative, science 
fiction, to test the plausibility of the Judicious Spectator as an adequate description of the activity 
of reading. Using the novel The Left Hand of Darkness as a test case, I argued that Nussbaum’s 
account of the Judicious Spectator as a description of readerly activity fails to capture the 
complex possibilities for self-examination and immersive imaginative thought experiments that 
are present in fictional engagement. In particular, I argued that engagement with fictional worlds 
offer attentive readers the opportunity to reassess unexamined and potentially unjustified or 
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inconsistent beliefs and attitudes that play a role in their moral judgments of which they may not 
even be aware.  I argue that this literary invitation to re-evaluate existing beliefs is morally 
significant and a generalizable feature of the reading experience.  I conclude that this shows 
Nussbaum’s account of engagement with fiction to be at best, incomplete.  
I began this discussion in chapter one with a sympathetic nod to Nussbaum’s stated project, 
and I want to suggest that the avenues of further research sketched above are congruent with her 
initial outline of a defense of the value of literature that takes seriously the idea of our emotions 
being essential to proper judgment. I have argued that Nussbaum’s account of this value as 
contained in her Emotional Engagement View is untenable for a number of reasons summarized 
above, but I remain convinced that her initial intuition that our emotional responses to literature 
are genuine and morally significant is correct. What I want to suggest with the brief outlines 
provided of Korsgaard and Ricoeur is that these theorists might offer up more promising avenues 
in which to explore and describe this feature of engagement with narrative. I do not take my 
critical discussion of Nussbaum’s view to be a conclusive dismissal of cognitively sophisticated 
emotions as valuable to sound moral judgment. I take this paper to have shown only that there 
are significant difficulties with Nussbaum’s particular account of the Judicious Spectator 
Position as an adequate description of this connection. I take my argument to show that any 
explanation of the moral significance of engagement with literature needs to account for the full 
complexity of the relationship between the text in question and the self-conception of the reader 
who engages with it. I remain convinced that this is an attainable goal, and a worthwhile one at 
that.  
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